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21.04.07
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Russia Profile Weekly Experts' Panel: Teasing The Kremlin
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Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
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Contributors: Stephen Blank, James George Jatras, Eugene Kolesnikov, Eric Kraus, Andrew Kuchins, Andrei Lebedev, Andrei Seregin, Vlad Sobell, Andrei Tsygankov, Andrei Zagorski.
Last weekend, radical opposition groups led by former world chess champion Garry Kasparov and former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov staged two unsanctioned street demonstrations, called Dissenters’ Marches, in downtown Moscow and St. Petersburg. Both were rather brutally suppressed by the police. Kasparov, along with around 200 other protesters, was briefly arrested and then released to talk to the media.
The Dissenters’ March has become the tactic of choice for radical opposition groups clustered around The Other Russia – an informal grouping of liberals and nationalists opposed to President Vladimir Putin’s policies. The Other Russia plans to stage such rallies in all major Russian cities before the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007-2008.
In early March, the same kind of opposition rally in St. Petersburg broke into street violence. Since then, the Kremlin has decided to use maximum preventive force to send the message that unsanctioned street demonstrations would be quickly suppressed in hopes of dissuading potential sympathizers from joining the protesters.
All of the Dissenters’ Marches have been given full press coverage in the West. Major Western news organizations play up the significance of the protests as open defiance to Putin’s alleged authoritarianism. The U.S. State Department even issued a statement denouncing the break-up of an unsanctioned Dissenters’ March in Nizhny Novgorod in late March.
However, attendance at the radical opposition rallies in Russia has been relatively small – ranging from a few hundred to a couple of thousand protesters. Most Russians do not share the gloomy view of the dissenters on the way the country is going. Those who join the protests are not motivated by an uncompromising hate for Putin’s regime; rather, they have a much narrower agenda that deals with local issues like garbage cleanup, construction permits or disputes with specific construction projects, as was the case in St. Petersburg. They just want to send a message to the local authorities.
The West, however, wishes to believe that massive popular opposition to Putin exists. Last week, Moscow fumed over the State Department report “Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2006,” which bluntly stated that the U.S. government is providing financial assistance to “democratically-oriented” Russian parties to strengthen their organizational capacity and encourage coalition building in preparation for the 2007-2008 elections. Moscow took serious offence at the report, and both the Foreign Ministry and the Duma denounced the report as an encroachment on Russia’s sovereignty.
Ever on the lookout to add fuel to the fire, Boris Berezovsky gave an incendiary interview to the Guardian newspaper, calling for a forceful overthrow of Putin’s regime and smugly implying that he had already been financing that effort by giving money to people in Putin’s inner circle with the goal of destroying the regime from within.
All of this, understandably, could not but reinforce the siege mentality that has already taken hold of the Kremlin. The expectation that the West would certainly be conspiring to prevent Putin from orchestrating a smooth power transition to his chosen successor in 2008 has become a key factor in the current decision-making. It clearly drives the Kremlin’s occasionally disproportionate response to the activities of self-proclaimed oppositionists like Kasparov, Kasyanov and Eduard Limonov, leader of the National Bolsheviks.
Does the Kremlin have a cause for concern? Is the regime really in danger of being undermined? Does it overreact in its response to opposition protests and thus boost their credibility? Why does the West continue to support the radical Russian opposition, which has little following in Russia, to the clear detriment of Western interests? How should Moscow react to Western efforts to support opposition to Putin? How will this impact Russia’s relations with the West in the long term?
Vlad Sobell, Daiwa Institute of Research Europe, London
Let us step back a little. A decade and half ago, Russia emerged from seventy years of initially nasty, but later a merely geriatric form of totalitarianism – a disease that, with few exceptions, affected the entire European continent. Soviet totalitarianism had the distinction of running a monstrosity best described as a “value-destroying” system. This manmade disaster ensured chronic shortages of everything, including the basic essentials. Westerners, who at the same time experienced an unprecedented prosperity, can have no concept of what living under these conditions must have been like.
Having exhausted the supply of commodities to “destroy,” the Soviet economic system finally collapsed. But no paradise ensued. On the contrary, Russians were rewarded with even greater impoverishment and unbridled lawlessness. They also witnessed the fruits of their labor being appropriated by a tiny group of unscrupulous billionaires, skilled above all at parking their loot offshore. Some of them became heroes for democracy in the eyes of the West.
Then along came Vladimir Putin with his “dictatorship of the law” and managed democracy. This coincided with a sharp economic recovery, delivering welfare and widespread prosperity for the first time in Russia’s history. At long last, Russia has started to catch up with the West, gradually becoming a normal country. While these changes cannot be directly attributed to Putin’s regime, at a minimum he has done nothing to prevent it. And by all evidence, the political structures and culture he has fostered will continue to deliver more of the same.
In view of these fundamental facts, the notion that the likes of Garry Kasparov stand an infinitesimal chance of winning the presidential elections or causing the regime’s downfall is, to put it politely, bizarre. It is not even worth commenting on.
Nevertheless, the current intensification of the long-standing efforts to discredit and destabilize the regime – obviously planned to coincide with the parliamentary and presidential elections – tells us a lot about the state of affairs in the West, especially in the United States.
Influential groups in Washington and other capitals are clearly bent on ignoring the vital interests of the long-suffering Russian populace and continue to foment a downfall of Putin’s regime. This may look democratic, but the approach is actually an arrogant and reckless intervention in the affairs of a sovereign nation, menacing the green shoots of their hard-won and deserved prosperity.
Furthermore, destabilizing Russia might unleash forces on the Eurasian continent that would make the U.S.-engineered chaos in Iraq look like a storm in a teacup. When will our American friends realize that something in their attitude is seriously wrong?
Andrew Kuchins, Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC
The first problem with the framing of this issue is the liberal use of the term “radical opposition.” Suggesting that former Prime Minister Kasyanov is “radical” is pretty absurd when you look at his history. I would say the same about Garry Kasparov. The problem is that the current Russian government (note that I did not use word “regime”) defines any opposition as de facto “radical.”
In fact, it is perfectly obvious that the Kremlin has systematically done virtually everything possible to ensure that no real opposition can exist in present-day Russia. Presidential elections taking place in Nigeria this coming weekend will be more competitive and, indeed, democratic than whatever transpires in the Russian presidential vote next year. If I were part of the Russian government, I would not take that as a point of pride.
The United States is not seeking to support opposition in Russia, but rather to support the development of real democratic governance. What the West wishes for is not opposition to Putin per se, but support for a genuine democracy in Russia. Note that there is nothing “democratic” about Putin’s goal for the upcoming electoral cycle. Rather, it is described as a “transfer of power to a hand-picked successor.” So, naturally, in that context, any actions to shore up democracy will be viewed by the Kremlin as interference and/or support for the opposition.
I cannot comment on whether a siege mentality exists in the Kremlin, since I don’t engage with members of the Putin administration on a regular enough basis to judge. But the deployment of approximately 9,000 OMON riot police and other troops on the streets of Moscow for a demonstration of no more than 2,000 people does suggest a rather heightened sense of vulnerability on the part of somebody in charge.
Why not let them march? Why not let them engage in free speech? If the ruling authorities were confident in their own platform and position, how could they really feel threatened by this? Why should a president with such high ratings be fearful of a few thousand marchers in Moscow or anywhere else in Russia? Does the Kremlin fear that respondents to survey research questions about Mr. Putin answer positively about him because they fear repercussions of a negative response?
Finally, let’s dispense with the use of the qualifier “alleged” in reference to Putin’s authoritarianism. If the Russian government wants to be more like China, that is its choice. But let’s not suggest there is anything really democratic about it. Russians still enjoy more political and personal freedoms than the Chinese, but the trend in Russia points more towards China than to Europe.
James George Jatras, Principal, Squires Sanders Public Advocacy, LLC ( www.ssd.com/sspa );
Director, American Council for Kosovo ( http://www.savekosovo.org/ )
The West, and especially most of official Washington, continues to push the Kremlin because they cannot imagine any acceptable government in Moscow except for the kind that existed in the immediate post-Soviet era. This means a government that took its cue from its Western mentors and never let Russia’s national interests interfere with the opinions of a foreign establishment that had come to see itself as the embodiment of all progress in global development.
In an eerie parallel with the “scientific” Leninist expectation that all historical development in all countries must take more-or-less the same path irrespective of local traditions and moral sensibilities, “democracy” has become less a matter of whether governance reflects a country’s particular notions of a proper social order than whether the result is the one favored by the West. Hence the paradox that the supposed “democrats” in Russia have the support of almost nobody, while President Putin, who by all accounts is quite popular, is the embodiment of anti-democracy. Democracy without people and people whose desires are anti-democratic: this is the Alice in Wonderland world in which we find ourselves.
Thus, dominant Western elites view Russia through a distorted lens that says less about Russia than about their own quasi-Bolshevik delusions of a desirable global order. From such a perspective, it isn’t much of a leap to identify “democracy,” “human rights,” and associated concepts as synonymous with a “Euro-Atlantic” geopolitical orientation, with Washington striving to maintain its leading role, mainly through NATO.
Perhaps the most troubling thing is that this really is not just a cynical ploy. Much of official Washington – and I emphasize, this means Democrats no less than Republicans – are so ensnared in their Manichean perception of themselves as the anointed Vanguard of all Progressive Humanity, that they can no longer distinguish reality from their own ideological projections.
For reasons far too detailed to describe in this space, the practical effect of this orientation is that much of Western elite opinion is not just anti-Putin; it is anti-Russian on a fundamental level. Does this mean that Russia should give up on its relationship with the United States, or with the West in general? Absolutely not. For while the phenomenon described above has been the dominant tendency in both U.S. parties for some time, there is reason to hope that it is waning in influence and that other opinions – always present, but recessive –are increasingly in a position to make themselves felt.
Part of the hope for change is negative: U.S. global dominance is faltering for reasons that have little to do with Russia. Part is positive: the resurgence of Russian influence and confidence is undeniable, especially in the near abroad and the Balkans. In particular, Russia having the last word on Kosovo will speak volumes.
But perhaps most hopefully, there are opinion sectors and serious experts in the United States and other western countries who understand well that, despite certain differences, Putin’s Russia is indeed a genuine democracy with a relatively free press and reasonably competitive elections. In addition, there are broad segments of the politically aware Western public that, if properly cultivated, can be brought to bear to Russia’s advantage. For example, many Americans are concerned about U.S. dependence on Middle Eastern sources of energy that, at least indirectly, fund terrorism. Few of them associate Russia with that concern, either as a positive or a negative. If properly packaged, Russia can be seen as part of the solution to that problem, making it a potential plus with those Americans.
While the current direction of U.S. policy has virtually zero prospects for bringing down the Putin government or seriously affecting prospects for a stable transition in 2008, the longer-term direction of the U.S.-Russia relationship deserves serious hands-on attention, for the benefit of both countries. A targeted issues-based cultivation of U.S. opinion that emphasizes Russia’s unique credentials, rather than the cookie-cutter standards of today’s ideologues, would help create conditions for a genuine partnership that takes account of Russia’s ascending global profile.
Andrei Tsygankov, Associate Professor, San Francisco State University, San Francisco
The Kremlin overreacted and admitted it. There was no need to use force, since the participants of the Dissenters’ March did not try to cause any public disturbances. This time they were merely looking for attention, mostly from Western media and Western governments. Despite the radical nature of the opposition and the number of provocations they have organized in the past, there was also hardly a need to ban the marches. It is clear that their participants only represent themselves. They have no support among Russians and no potential to mobilize the population to resist the new “totalitarian” regime. Therefore, the best defense against potential disturbances and revolutions is to let revolutionaries blow off steam and eventually die out on their own, rather than to grant them the attention they are desperate to obtain.
Should a radical opposition cause public disturbances, however, the state has a right and obligation before Russian citizens to restore order, including by the use of force if other means are not available. The state holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and revolutionaries need to be reminded of this maxim again and again. Given the past record of the Limonovs and the Ampilovs, as well as a number of law-defiant statements from Kasparov, Kasyanov, Berezovsky and others, their involvement in organizing public disturbances and provocations is not difficult to imagine.
The bigger question is whether there is a potential in the longer run for mobilizing protestors against the Kremlin’s policies. In principle, all economic modernizations, including the Kremlin’s, generate disaffected strata, and there are number of social groups in Russia who feel the burden of reforms more than others. It is also clear that a number of influential elites abroad used the state’s weakness to assert their own economic and political agendas in Russia and in the former Soviet region. Yet so long as the state is able to carefully readjust its policies to address protests of social and economic nature, the political system and regime stability are not in danger.
Andrei Zagorski, Professor, MGIMO-University, Moscow
First, it is wrong to believe that “the West supports opposition” to Putin. On the contrary, I haven’t met any serious Russia expert or policy maker from the West who would give a chance to either The Other Russia or any other opposition group. Almost everyone in the West is disappointed by the past performance of the “democratic” political forces in Russia. Nobody believes the opposition can win even if the upcoming elections would be fair.
This is the reason everybody in the West seeks to engage with United Russia. The only confusion facing policy makers is the role of Just Russia, the other branch of the Politburo sitting in the Kremlin. Without knowing how relevant this new party is going to be, they have to start gradually engaging it as well.
Against this background, the opposition in Russia has more reasons to claim that the West has abandoned democracy in Russia. Likewise, the Kremlin has little reason to suggest that the West goes too far in supporting democracy in Russia.
Secondly, the Western reaction to the recent Dissenters’ March in Moscow should be seen through the proper lens. The right to demonstrate is one of the fundamental freedoms recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It does not need any “authorization” from the Kremlin. Thus, any criminalization of political opposition appears on the front pages of the world’s media and produces sympathy with those stigmatized. The same day the demonstration in Moscow was shut down, I met with a group of journalists from Europe who happened to witness what they judged to be a peaceful manifestation. They were shocked by the brutality of the police.
Thirdly, the Kremlin’s policy is not unique. Attempts to isolate, marginalize and even criminalize the opposition are typical of every authoritarian government. Such policy shapes the image of these regimes more than anything else they do. However, authoritarian regimes can afford to ignore the international reaction if they are confident they don’t have to fear political consequences at home. In this, Moscow is not unique either.
However, this policy has never been successful in the long run. It does not increase loyalty to the regime, though it helps spread opportunism. Most importantly, by not admitting the possibility to articulate protest through institutionalized political avenues, it does not allow the dissent to be translated into politics, and thus forces the opposition to react outside the official political system. Once the resources available to the regime are no longer sufficient to sustain broad-based social welfare, the system tends to implode.
Stephen Blank, U.S. Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA
(Dr. Blank’s views as expressed to Russia Profile do not represent those of the U.S. Army, or the U.S. Department of Defense)
If the Russian government has a siege mentality, it is due to its own fundamental sense of being an illegitimate government. This explains why 20,000 policemen were on the scene in Nizhny Novgorod and 9,000 more in Moscow. This sense shows its true weakness and inability to trust in the constitutional mechanisms. It also explains why so many elites want Putin to dispense once and for all with the pretense of democracy and stay on.
The irony here is that Putin would probably have been reelected in 2004 without any machinations. In fact, the Kremlin's paranoia about U.S. intervention reflects both this abiding sense of illegitimacy and its own hysteria in that it has fallen for its own propaganda and the habitual tendency of the FSB to politicize its analysis and intelligence assessments.
Neither the United States nor Europe organized or inspired any of the color revolutions. They found domestic support because these revolutions were actually protests against crude efforts by the ruling governments to corrupt election procedures in these countries. Moreover, if anyone intervened in Ukraine, it was Moscow, which invested over $300 million to ensure that Viktor Yanukovich was elected and conducted a pro-Moscow foreign policy. The charge that the United States or others are behind efforts to unseat the Russian or other CIS regimes stems from Moscow's desperate reaction to its failures abroad and its own sense of illegitimacy due to years of manipulating elections going back to Yeltsin.
Notwithstanding the data released in the U.S. reports, American institutions are not doing much beyond what German foundations like the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation have been doing abroad for years with little or no outcry about them. As a signatory to the Helsinki and Moscow treaties of 1975 and 1991, Russia can hardly claim such activities are illegal.
Indeed Russian fears about the fragility of the regime derive from domestic causes, not Western activity. A more confident and legitimate government would trust the good sense of the Russian people and allow them to vote freely in 2007-2008. After all, given Putin's popularity and achievements, they could run on a strong platform and record without fearing the outcome. But because Russia is still a country governed by men, not laws, with an increasingly neo-tsarist autocracy, such an outcome is highly unlikely. Yet this merely perpetuates the values gap and condemns the next Russian government in advance to tension with the West, even though no Western government supports an overthrow of the regime.
These anti-democratic machinations by the government in Moscow explain the Western support for the opposition parties; the regime has snuffed out any opportunity for legitimate political action and opposition under the law. As long as this continues to be the case, the West will look favorably upon the opposition and the government will live in a siege mentality of its own making.
After all, if, as Vladimir Frolov and many others contend, most Russians support the regime or at least do not espouse the opposition’s agenda, what is the government risking by moving towards genuine democratization? If anything, a truly democratic mandate that is legitimately attained would strengthen the hand of any future Russian government. Furthermore, such a regime could then take Western actions on behalf of the opposition in stride. Hysteria and self-delusion are unbecoming emotions in a state that claims to be a great power. If Russia truly were such, it would not be so intent on revealing that the state as presently constructed has no secure foundation.
Although it is most unlikely to occur, a Russian state that believes in itself should therefore cease attempting to stifle political life and return to a path of consistent democratization, governmental accountability, and the rule of law. If the regime continues as it has and surrenders to its fears, the absence of legitimate mechanisms for opposition will ensure that illegitimate political activities will be the order of the day.
Eugene Kolesnikov, Private Consultant, the Netherlands
How should the government deal with marches and demonstrations staged by a small group of radicals in order to destabilize the situation in the country? This depends on whether these radicals have a chance to achieve their goal. The color revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan show that such a goal is achievable. Although Russia is much more stable and the population is much more content, a lot of harm can still be done.
Just imagine that the Russian government gives in to the U.S. State Department and allows the innocent dissenters to hold their marches where they want and not where the state permits. Soon we will have a handful of radicals in each big city setting up orange tents close to government buildings and demanding regime change. These groups would then be joined by those who want to have some fun and let out their pent up personal emotions.
Meanwhile, these little encampments are vigorously portrayed by the Western media as a true expression of dissent that otherwise has been subdued in Russia. Any incident is blown out of proportion to show the truly repressive nature of the regime and to demand democratic change. The end result is that a ballot will be held in an atmosphere of hype. Election results are declared rigged or unrepresentative, and the whole destabilization business is happily perpetuated.
This is the color revolution franchise in action. It is difficult to establish whether the opposition movement in Russia was directly instigated by the West or just gathered momentum on the sheer attractiveness of the franchise. This, however, does not really matter since the United States and its European allies have already jumped at the opportunity.
In this dangerous moment, the Russian government needs to remain strong and not allow this franchise to take over the country’s political life. Radicals should demonstrate in accordance with the law in places sanctioned by the government. If enforcing this requires the use of force, than it should be used to avoid much more damage to the country and its people.
Eric Kraus, Managing Director, Anyatta Capital, advisor to the Nikitsky Russia/CIS Opportunities Fund
It would appear that only two factions take the Dissenters’ Marches seriously within Russia: the organizers and the Kremlin. While the vast majority of Russians cordially despise the oppositionist triumvirate comprised of two crooks and one neo-fascist, it is a matter of some confusion as to why the Kremlin persists in treating them as a serious threat.
To seek a rational explanation for the systematic use of cannons to kill houseflies is probably a waste of time – the administration does not fear any “snowballing of a popular protest movement.” Instead, the government’s actions are heavy-handed by nature. Given any slight danger of a provocation, no senior functionary will run the risk of a moderate response, dispatching 9,000 riot police in order to contain a rag-tag band of perhaps 1,500 discontents.
While the fundamental logic of the Russian administration in this matter escapes us, the dissidents’ approach is more obvious. Kasyanov and Kasparov are fully aware that domestically they stand no chance whatsoever – Kasyanov is one of the few men in Russia whom even Putin could not get elected. Neither imagines that he can rally the Russian people to rise up and overthrow the state.
Instead, the marches are media events clearly aimed at the West – in particular, to satisfy Washington that there is an opposition in Russia, and that Kasyanov is at the head of it. By sending in riot police to break up a Saturday picnic, the Russian government most egregiously played into their hands.
Washington’s “diplomacy” is increasingly pathetic: they will back virtually anyone – Marxist, fascist or simply corrupt – provided only that they are opposed to Putin. The arrogance of the State Department’s claim to support Russian opposition parties is breathtaking. Imagine if Russia, concerned with the serious deterioration of American democracy under Bush, announced that it was funding the U.S. opposition.
The fundamental problem lies in Washington’s twisted view of how the world sees it. That an “authoritarian regime” could be imposed upon the long-suffering Russian people is certainly within the scope of America’s standpoint. On the other hand, for the U.S. establishment to accept that the Russian people could freely and enthusiastically support a relatively nationalist regime unfavorable to Euro-Atlantic interests would require a painful rethink of the United States’ own millennial ideology. Remember, this is the same Bush clique that expected the Iraqis to greet the invading U.S. troops with roses rather than bombs.
Not usually prone to conspiracy theories, I must acknowledge the obvious – Washington’s policy is as transparently self-serving as it is clumsy. When Russia was falling apart in the 1990s, there was precious little concern for its imperfect democracy. Under Putin, Russia has made fools of the obituary writers with its unprecedented transformation from a mendicant nation surviving on aid to a rising regional power.
While we understand that the hegemon does not like competition, its position is simply a matter of power politics and should be presented as such. Attempts to disguise it as some benevolent defense of democracy results in the sort of blatant hypocrisy that has wiped out its credibility worldwide.
Andrei Seregin, Senior Political Analyst, National Laboratory for Foreign Policy, Moscow
The West is going to sacrifice Russia’s liberal opposition to establish a “Russian Tiananmen” precedent ahead of the presidential elections. Marching in the two Russian capitals recently, dissenters may not have noticed that Washington has begun fine-tuning its transformational diplomacy tactic in Russia.
The good news is that the White House still shows its commitment to help Russian pro-democracy political forces compete in forthcoming elections. Sadly, however, Washington is not satisfied with the results of its efforts in Russia thus far.
Unlike the situation in Ukraine and Georgia, betting on mass civil disobedience to bring change has evidently failed in this country. Today's protesters are being rapidly marginalized - the crowds they gather are far less than the ones of turbulent 1990s, and popular support for the government is much higher. The anti-government groups themselves are highly fractured, both operationally and ideologically. Embedded in them are liberals, nationalists, communists and various other radicals.
Thus, the most logical change in the U.S. approach would be to shift focus from staging mass protests to the kinds of activities aimed at supporting Soviet dissidents during the Cold War.
The tactics being used now, however, represent gradual efforts to undermine the international reputation of the Russian democracy and, therefore, the legal basis of the ruling government. It's worth considering that State Department officials have been steadily warning: “elections are not enough for democracy.” The idea is first to portray Russia as a weak democracy that doesn't deliver, setting it up to be seen as an oppressive regime. The key element in this transformation must inevitably be a massive and brutal suppression of dissenters by riot police, similarly to what happened on Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989.
Today’s Russian protesters by nature seem more and more like their Soviet predecessors. Though small and largely irrelevant to the aspirations of Soviet people, the small group of oppressed dissidents once played a major role in Washington's dialogue with Moscow, enabling the White House to impose sanctions and restrictions on trade and other relations with the Kremlin.
Now, with wide media coverage in Russia and abroad inflating the image and expectations of the protesters, staging unsanctioned protests and street marches will provoke the authorities to overreact. This is the very reason The Other Russia plans to stage rallies in all major Russian cities before the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007-2008.
However, Washington's active meddling in Russian affairs may have an adverse effect. It has already reinforced anti-American sentiments among Russians. Recent U.S. State Department activities to help “democracy-oriented political forces” in Russia have long been undermining the local support of those inside the country. “The Western conspiracy against Putin” theme is already deep in the minds of Russian grassroots electorate, as well as a good part of establishment decision-making. Furthermore, there will inevitably be some nationalistic hardliners who can effectively play on these sentiments during the electoral campaigns later this year and in 2008.
Considering the condition mentioned above, the main cause of concern for the Kremlin seems to be the possibility of falling into the obvious trap of overreacting to opposition rallies at home and meddling from abroad. Maintaining calm means showing self-confidence. And China's experience may teach us that there is life even after Tiananmen.
Andrei Lebedev, Senior Associate, the State Club Foundation, Moscow
In the absence of a positive program, the dissenters depend on their loud street actions to garner support both within and (mostly) outside the country. They understand, of course, that they have no chance of winning or getting their candidates elected at any level. The reasons are, first, the general resistance of the electorate to their anti-regime slogans; second, the strange assortment of fellow travelers pursuing their diverse ends precludes the group from unifying.
There are two major sources of strength for the dissenters. One is foreign public opinion and politicians eager to exploit the situation. And the protesters count on it. As a journalist from the Russian newspaper Sobesednik notes, her numerous attempts to interview Mikhail Kasyanov failed – until the march on April 14, when he became eager to talk to the press about the police actions.
The other source is the position of the Russian authorities. Teasing the Kremlin has been successful. The provocative course of the dissenters attracted more than fair amount of attention – not to their cause, but to their “martyrdom” at the hands of the brutal police. Unwanted parallels are drawn, revulsion of those indifferent to the dissenters or even opposing them is stirred, sympathy for the “oppressed” is secured. Consequently, the authorities lose points as the opposition makes gains.
This is not to say that the electoral or non-electoral aspirations of the dissenters become more feasible. They speak for almost no actual electorate and represent no danger to the regime. However, this marginal opposition has become a thorn for the Russian authorities, which can be easily bothered by fervent anti-Russian politicians. |
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