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04.05.07
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Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: 2008 And Beyond
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Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
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Contributors: Ethan S. Burger, Eugene Kolesnikov, Andrei Lebedev, Andrei Zagorski
Last Thursday, President Vladimir Putin delivered his final Address to the Federal Assembly. Although Putin stated that the next state of the nation address will be delivered by a new president of Russia, the content and tone of the speech made it clear that Putin would stick around to ensure that the country stays on the course he has charted.
Putin outlined an ambitious agenda in economic and social development that goes beyond his term in office and essentially locks the next president, whoever he might be, into a policy direction Putin thinks is be right for the country. From establishing a housing reconstruction fund to setting up a $3 billion state corporation fund for nanotechnologies, Putin has set a reform agenda Russia’s next president would find difficult to abandon.
In the field of foreign policy, Putin has also laid out markers his successor will have to follow, including a moratorium on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty as well as renewed pledges for a union state with Belarus.
So what is the program Putin wants to impose on his successor? What kind of Russia does he want the new president to build? Will the feuding Russian political elite maintain its loyalty to Putin and his course after he retires from the Kremlin? How realistic is the idea that a popular outgoing president can impose a political consensus for years to come? Will Putin signal his personal choice and sway the election in favor of one candidate, or will he nominate at least two (or even three) and let them compete freely for the hearts and minds of Russia’s voters?
Eugene Kolesnikov, Private Consultant, the Netherlands:
Putin himself defined the significance of his last Address to the Federal Assembly by stating that, together with the previous addresses, it formulates a conceptual plan for the development of Russia. This plan recognizes that during Putin's presidency Russia has successfully transcended the destruction of identity and lack of direction that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and has reemerged as a new country with a new identity and a clear vision of its development path and its future geopolitical role.
The political fabric of this new Russia is being formed by the carefully managed implementation of a multi-party democracy, nurturing the roots of civil society and measured redistribution of authority to the regions. All this is done taking into account Russia's own needs and possibilities while discarding externally promoted blueprints that failed to work or are utterly detrimental to the country.
In the economic sphere, the conceptual plan emphasizes the role of the state for propelling Russia into industrial modernization by investing heavily into and maintaining control of its economic commanding heights—quite similar to the Japanese and South Korean development models. This includes massive national infrastructure projects, such as development of roads, railroads, airports, ports and undertaking a “second electrification” of the country. This plan also includes accelerated growth of the national champions in non-resource industries: aviation, ship building, the military-industrial complex and nuclear energy. Investment in fundamental and applied science and technology forms part of the modernization drive.
The focus on spiritual unity of the nation, moral values and social justice that has been maintained through all eight presidential addresses provides the moral basis for this modernization plan. Soviet-style mass housing construction; improvement of the livelihood of pensioners, who suffered most in the aftermath of the economic collapse; and implementation of the other National Projects are an indispensable part of this strategic plan. The ironic proposal to use the proceeds of the Yukos re-nationalization for the improvement of housing conditions of the most destitute is quite symbolic, and is aimed at healing the trauma to which majority of the Russian population were subjected during privatization.
This model of development and modernization goes hand in hand with the new geopolitical role that Putin has constructed for Russia. The message here is that Russia is back on the world stage and will resume an active role there, in particular in the process of economic integration in the CIS area and Eurasia in general. Russia sees itself as an active geopolitical integrator and promoter of flows of capital, goods, services and labor in Eurasia. Russia's current position in the energy markets, extensive historical and newly developed ties with the economies of all CIS countries, and its continued employment of 10-15 million immigrants from these countries provide a solid basis for implementation of such a policy.
This bold vision to shape the geopolitical landscape in Eurasia is demonstrated by the announcement of the Volga-Don channel project that could link Caspian countries with the Black Sea. Other, perhaps more realistic, initiatives will certainly follow. The announcement of a moratorium on CFE Treaty – the part of the address that received the most attention in the West – is a logical step in fulfilling Russia's commitment to resisting U.S. unilateralism, which was announced by Putin in Munich.
It seems that Putin has finally managed to turn the page of Russian history that spoke about the possible disappearance of the country as a great nation and open a new page of the reemerging Russia. The undeniable benefits and attractiveness of this conceptual plan for the majority of Russians, including national elites, is the main guarantor of the continuity of the new course. Transition of power and handover of this plan to a new Duma and a new president are understandably the main political drivers in this modernization project.
Ethan S. Burger, Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service, American University, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.
Barring a severe and legitimate threat to Russia's national security and its survival and as a state, I consider it highly unlikely that Putin will seek a third term, particularly since such a step would violate the Russian Constitution. I doubt Putin would want to emulate Alexander Lukashenko. The Russian president has no great need to remain president in order to maintain power and influence in Russia – by the 2008 election, he will have sufficiently influenced his successor. Perhaps this is why he has allowed Boris Yeltsin's death to be treated with such respect, even after undoing many of his predecessor's policies.
Putin will probably remain politically active from the sidelines – having already indicated his intention not to disappear from public life – by either "advising" from a prominent post in the “private sector,” such as president or chairman of a large enterprise such as Gazprom; becoming a government minister or mayor of Moscow, since the tradition of collective leader is part of the country's political culture; or allowing for power to shift to the State Duma, where he could take a seat in a special election or through an appointment when an open seat is available due to someone's death or resignation.
Nothing in these three scenarios would preclude him from becoming the leader of one of the parties of power. Still, with respect to the last variant, it cannot be ruled out that this step could be facilitated by amending the Russian Constitution, making the position of prime minister much more powerful than it is presently.
Putin holding onto the presidency through a constitutional amendment would diminish his stature and influence both internationally (although foreign countries would acquiesce in the fate accompli) and domestically (The Other Russia, the Communist Party and other minority parties would have an issue that could win them much greater support.) It could also weaken him in unanticipated ways.
It is not an accident that Sergei Ivanov has been elevated to the same status as Dmitry Medvedev. Putin is likely to indicate whom he wishes as his successor, and the Russian political elite as well as the Russian electorate as a whole are likely to oblige. Of course, Putin’s appearance on the ballot cannot be totally ruled out, but such a move seem unnecessary in light of the discussion above.
Andrei Lebedev, Senior Associate, the State Club Foundation, Moscow:
Most of the analysis of Putin’s last Address to the Federal Assembly has tended to forget that it happened to be just the latest in a series. Each of the addresses dealt with figures that applied to specific years, of course, as well as outlining some immediate tasks, but at the core of the addresses between 2005-2007 is a program of development of Russia for years, if not for decades to come. The earlier two tended to deal more with the social and economic problems; the latter focused on foreign policy. The rapid growth of science and technology could change the specifics occasionally, for example, making more space for coal instead of oil or permitting mass production of vehicles using completely different principles of transportation. However, the basic principles for the country’s progress have been laid out clearly enough.
There seems to be wide consensus in Russia about the goals highlighted in the addresses. Different elites argue with each other mainly about the ways and means (especially budget means) of reaching these goals. Nobody would counter Putin’s aspirations for making the country mighty and prosperous, and the opponents of some of the methods of achieving these goals (for example, supporters of free competition denouncing state and monopolistic capitalism) are a powerless minority.
Most important is the proof of the success of Putin’s plan thus far – not from public opinion polls, but from economic statistics. The latest official data shows that small business turnover in the first nine months of 2006 increased by more than 17 percent, and its investments grew by more than a quarter. This is both a result of the government’s economic policy and the index of trust of the most mobile economic element in the powers-that-be.
So the frame has basically been set. If the main goal is securing Russian national interests for generations to come, then whoever “the successor” happens to be will find it next to impossible not to follow the marked path. Historically, instruments of advancing are well-known and always the same: centralized political power, balanced state budget, stimulating foreign trade (primarily exports), supporting a strong army and navy.
Incidentally, these principles suggest that Sergei Ivanov should be Putin’s natural choice. His advantage over his undeclared opponent Dmitry Medvedev is experience in military and foreign affairs.
Andrei Zagorski, Professor, MGIMO-University, Moscow:
This year’s annual address by Putin is probably the weakest of all the addresses he has delivered over the past years. Its horizon is obviously limited to the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. It does not read as an agenda-setting speech, but contains populist slogans and promises to different interest groups while avoiding naming the pressing structural problems that require painful decisions.
This is not a surprise considering the upcoming election cycle. Elections dictate a different agenda, which involves buying the loyalty of different constituencies. In this respect, the 2007 address sharply contrasts with Putin’s ambitious reform agenda at the beginning of his first term. Not only was this agenda poorly implemented, it was largely abandoned after 2004. The other striking effect of this year’s address was its very Soviet style. Indeed, it sounded very much like a report from the secretary general to the party congress.
This is another reason that Putin cannot set the agenda beyond his term in office. Provided that there is a succession, and the succession takes place smoothly, the new leader appointed by the Kremlin’s party and confirmed in a popular election is very much likely to do what every single new Soviet leader did. They all developed a totally different agenda from their predecessors, even if their election initially rested on a consensus of different groups.
For at least two reasons, Putin’s successor will be virtually forced to develop a different agenda.
First, he or she will have to act in a changing economic environment. Even if world energy prices don’t drop, the rent accumulated in the hands of the state is unlikely to grow further since the prices are expected to rise further and the output in the export sectors cannot be increased dramatically. For that reason, the growing state expenditures and the fast growing imports will increasingly eat away the shrinking budget profits and trade surplus, thus limiting the room for maneuver available to the government. It seems that resources that were accumulated in the years of Putin’s rule are likely to be spent now to avoid any surprises during the election period, and would not be available to the successor, at least not in the same magnitude.
Secondly, in foreign policy, Putin seems to be repeating the cycle Yeltsin went through. Both started as enthusiasts of a rapprochement with the United States and the West but both end up short of a “cold peace,” accompanied by spreading “Russia fatigue” resentment in the West. Any successor to Putin shall be expected, therefore, to do what Putin did in his first years in office – introduce significant correctives into the foreign policy of the predecessor in order to restore the balance and to allow for a constructive partnership and cooperation with the West to grow. |
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