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06.07.07
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Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Gone Fishing
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Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
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Another Look at the Lobster Summit in Maine
Contributors: Sergei Shishkarev, Eugene Kolesnikov, Andrei Lebedev, Stephen Blank
On July 2, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin visited President George W. Bush at his family’s summer oceanfront retreat at Kennebunkport, Maine.
Bush extended the invitation to Putin back in late May, just in time to ease tensions that had built up in Russian-U.S. relationship on the eve of the G8 meeting in Germany.
But the relationship has not made much progress since then, with both sides staking quite different positions on such issues as the planned deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Eastern Europe and the future status of Kosovo. The war of words between Moscow and Washington has not decreased much either.
In this atmosphere, both sides quite purposefully played down expectations by emphasizing the unofficial and almost recreational nature of the meeting in which the two leaders would simply exchange ideas about what is going on in the world and what needs to be done by the two nations to affect positive outcomes.
There are, however, some signs that some practical achievements were still quite possible at Kennebunkport. One example is a bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear energy cooperation (the so-called 123 Agreement) that would open up new opportunities for nuclear industries to cooperate without fear of U.S. sanctions. There are also signs that Russia and the United States will announce a new framework for strategic nuclear reductions to replace the confidence-building transparency measures of the START I Treaty that expires in 2009. This alone would represent a deliverable of enough significance to call the meeting a clear success.
Was this likely? Or did the summit turn into another soul-gazing session? What effect did the meeting have on the Russia-U.S. relationship? What will be the eventual outcome of discussions on missile defense, Kosovo and Iran? Did it help change the tone which has been steadily deteriorating? How did the two leaders play the summit to their domestic audiences? How did the issue of democratic freedoms in Russia play out at Kennebunkport? Who emerged a stronger leader?
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Sergei Shishkarev, Deputy Chairman, Committee on Energy, Transportation and Communications, the Russian State Duma (United Russia)
The summit in Kennebunkport will be known in history as a turning point in U.S.-Russian relations. Vladimir Putin did significantly much more than his Western partners could expect. He offered to integrate our countries’ ABM systems. This means Russia trusts its partners; it also implies that we are ready to be allies with the United States if the sentiment were to be reciprocated. Russia is looking for equal signs of trust from the United States. That sign could be a decision to abandon plans to deploy ABM systems in Eastern Europe.
If President Putin’s offer were accepted, many of the problems in missile defense and strategic nuclear weapons reductions could be solved. We would have a chance to coordinate our efforts not only in a bilateral format, but also at the NATO-Russia Council. In other words there could appear conditions for forming a unique Eurasian-Atlantic pole of political and military power which could radically change the geopolitical situation and even the course of history itself.
On the other side, a rebuttal of Putin’s offer would force the Russian side to take measures to strengthen its national security. But that would lead to a completely different scenario.
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Eugene Kolesnikov, Private Consultant, the Netherlands
Although both sides managed to lower expectations about the Kennebunkport meeting, world media and political analysts keenly observed the ostensibly friendly gathering and were hanging on to every word let out by the leaders and their entourage. The marathon of open challenge and confrontation started by Putin’s speech in Munich and fueled by mutual recriminations since then required some sort of a climax. And that is what indeed happened in Kennebunkport in spite of the absence of any breakthroughs on American missile defense and Kosovo.
In my view President Bush's behavior and statements bear a subtle but clear message that the United States has finally, albeit reluctantly, recognized Russia as an independent and important counterpart in world affairs, a status that it granted so far only to China and, to some extent, to the EU. A flurry of frustrated remarks by American observers about the betrayal of ideals and failure to put Russia in its place simply show that the American administration managed to be more pragmatic in its assessment of Russia than the majority of the analytical corps.
Coming to terms with Russia's return to the league of world powers does not mean embracing Russia as an equal partner. The current administration is incapable of such a paradigm shift, since that would negate the strategy of American 'democratic' hegemony that has preoccupied its elites ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it provides an important opportunity for both sides to retract rhetorical weapons, agree to disagree on certain issues, pursue a common agenda, and start a sensible dialogue on such issues as strategic security cooperation. There is certainly a risk that hostilities may break out again under internal or external pressures, but the overall strategic imperative should prevail.
By making a second proposal on missile defense cooperation involving facilities on Russian territory, Putin reconfirmed Russia's commitment to European and Transatlantic integration that could go as far as the West is ready to take it, provided that Russia is treated as an equal partner. This is obviously a long shot. Although the 'unipolar moment' of the American Empire turned out to be short-lived and is sizzling out in the face of the rising powers of China, Russia and India – as well as the numerous developing crises and the "political awakening and stirring of the world," in the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski – the reconfiguration of the world politics will be a long and arduous process.
The Kennebunkport meeting was an important event as part of the cementing of Putin and Bush's legacies. Putin can hand over to his successor a Russia that has reclaimed its position in the world. Bush can pass on to the next Administration relations with Russia that were not "completely trashed" and have potential for revival.
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Andrei Lebedev, Senior Associate, the State Club Foundation, Moscow
Both presidents who met in Kennebunkport leave their offices next year. There is plenty of time left to achieve something momentous, of course, but the American media have already begun to call George Bush a lame duck. It seems that the U.S. president cares more and more about the legacy his successor will inherit. On the one hand, spoilt relations with Russia would not bolster this legacy. However, there is not much the White House can do in practical terms to improve the situation without losing face, given a lot of unilateral American actions and belligerent statements. Therefore, in order to put up a bold front, Washington has to look for symbolic gestures and PR gimmicks, such as inviting Vladimir Putin to Kennebunkport.
The idea backfired. The only fish caught in the Maine waters was caught by Putin. Nobody can call the Russian president a lame duck, because Russian politics will certainly stay much the same under any one of Putin’s successors. Bush’s Russian counterpart feels relieved of the usual constraints of the last year in office. Moreover, the Russian president evidently exercises more freedom to maneuver in foreign policy. It permitted him advance on the partial success of his earlier Gabala radar offer by including the Armavir radar and nuclear danger reduction centers in Moscow and Brussels in the package.
The United States will probably push through with its intent to construct a radar station and ABM missile silos in Eastern Europe. There seems to be an awareness of that in Moscow. The task is, therefore, to do one’s best to make Washington look like Mr. Bad Guy, reaping most praise in the process. Putin’s offer rose up to the task.
It would have been inappropriate in the circumstances to pump up the decision to resume consultations about START talks, so as not to whitewash Washington’s intransigent position on ABM sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. The absence of progress on the Kosovo problem and little if any on Iran added to the presentation of the Armavir offer as the main event of the summit.
Regardless of the practical consequences of Putin’s offer, the White House probably regrets the idea to invite the Russian president to Kennebunkport. Image-wise, it helped Vladimir Putin enormously to strengthen his hand abroad. As for the effect on the Russia-U.S. relationship, the potential of the Russian offer is enormous. But it would require a lot of political will from Washington to rise up to its level.
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Professor Stephen Blank, US Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA
(Dr. Blank’s views as contributed to Russia Profile do not represent the position of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the U.S. Government)
Based on the early news reports about this meeting, it can be said that while it may have lowered the temperature of the recent bilateral polemics, it did little or nothing to overcome the substantive differences between the parties. While dialogue is always useful, it appears that little was accomplished with the single exception of Iran. Thus, it would have been very desirable to have an agreement that facilitates the discussions on a new START treaty relevant to current issues and the overall strategic environment. Likewise, progress on Kosovo would have been mutually beneficial, with repercussions beyond the Balkans. But it does not appear that such agreements were reached.
The one exception, apparently, was Iran. Observers have noted a gradual but nonetheless discernible Russian frustration with Iran's intransigent approach to issues of nuclear enrichment and submission to the IAEA guidelines. Iran's refusal to heed those guidelines has raised Russian fears that Iran cannot be "controlled" as a partner. There is little doubt among the Russian government, rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, that Iran is going for a nuclear weapon. That Iranian propensity to overstep the limits of the partnership as defined by Russia means Iran is coming close to crossing Russia's “red lines,” leading Moscow to incline towards Washington and Europe's view of the Iranian threat and what should be done about it. Therefore, it is quite likely that a byproduct of this summit will be some agreement on ratcheting up the sanctions on Iran.
Otherwise, not much could have been expected to emerge from this meeting. Evidently, the differences between Moscow and Washington, which are essentially rooted in Russia's domestic structures of governance and the Bush administration's continuing adherence to what is a discredited and watered down but still operative strategic unilateralism, will preclude easy resolution of outstanding issues in the remaining months of these two presidents' tenure. |
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