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12.07.07
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How To Play The Games
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By Alexander Arkhangelsky
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RIA Novosti
A major event, whether in the economy, sports or culture, may not have been caused by political factors, but there are always political consequences that match the scale of what has transpired. We don’t know what would have happened if South Korea or Austria had won the right to the 2014 Winter Olympics. But can we speculate as to what the selection of Sochi as host of the winter games will mean for Russian authorities and Russian society in both the short and long terms?
As far as the short-term is concerned, everything is clear. It is possible to throw the details aside – the Krasnodar clan’s fortunes are made, as Governor Alexander Tkachev has managed to jump aboard the departing train of the new Russian aristocracy. Meanwhile, Alexander Pochinok, in becoming the senator for Krasnodar, has again been in the right place at the right time. And of course it’s better not to mention that the number of Russians on the Forbes list will expand due to the kickbacks likely to be involved in the construction contracts for the games. This is all merely detail. Here is what’s really important:
Exactly a year ago, Putin began preparations for his departure from the fortress of power. Having created an authoritarian cover for his personal rule, he has to weaken and divide that power before leaving the Kremlin. Otherwise, he could be dealt with in much the same way as he dealt with the oligarchs.
August of last year was notable for a series of resignations and dismissals, both in the FSB and the presidential administration; the investigation into the “Tri Kita” case was intensified, having been personally set in motion by the head of state, a fact that Putin himself publicly confirmed. But the chickens are counted in the fall, as the Russians say; in the autumn Anna Politkovskaya was killed, a journalist rarely taken seriously in Russia, but considered in the West to be a symbol of human rights journalism; straight afterwards Alexander Litvinenko was subjected to a polonium attack. He had managed to get British citizenship and, as a result, was under the protection of the British Crown.
The events cast a shadow over the head of the Russian state, although he personally had probably nothing to do with them. These dramas were only of use to the siloviki faction, and played into the hands of that bloc’s ostensible enemy, exiled tycoon Boris Berezovsky. They were also clear and direct blows for Putin’s integrity in the West. It seems obvious that this was the aim of these special operations: to show who is boss, to cut the president off from the external world, to doom him to a third term, after which he wouldn’t be entirely legitimate and would thus be held more accountable.
The supreme leader retreated and went into hiding. He carefully demonstrated his hawkish stance with regard to Westerners and his dovish tenderness towards his entourage. The children of the new aristocrats were demonstratively shown great consideration. The young Patrushevs, Ivanovs, Fradkovs were all rewarded, some with medals for their many years of heroic work; the Kovalchuks were given new positions.
But gradually, little by little, Putin pursued his own line. He began to get the West accustomed to the idea that today’s Russia is not so much a political system as an economic corporation where electoral democracy doesn’t work. Therefore, changing managers, building up a team and providing for the internal security of information should be the responsibility of the main shareholder, not the people out in the street.
The West resisted the idea, but finally calmed down. At the G8 summit in Heiligendamm a wordless agreement was achieved: nobody is demanding real domestic competitiveness from Moscow, as long as Moscow will soften its foreign policy line. A third term or no third term; siloviki or no siloviki; Chavez or no Chavez; Bush or no Bush: you sort it out and we’ll turn a blind eye to it all, as long as the gas is delivered on time and there are no preparations for war.
Only one question remains: What is the name of that main shareholder? What’s his surname? Until Sochi, illusions or doubts, call them what you will, could be maintained. After Sochi, the answer is clear. The first letter is a P, there’s an N at the end, and there’s U and a T and an I in there somewhere. The decision of the International Olympic Committee suited the main shareholder, based on the assumption that until 2014 he will remain as the guarantor – if not the Constitution, then of the Olympic Games.
It is immaterial if it takes the form of a third term or priority projects. The only important thing is that it will be him. He has been given international guarantees of respect and security. Politkovskaya and Litvinenko no longer matter; the personal window to Europe has been opened. It doesn’t really matter now who will be on the next shift (it’s just one presidential term, a gap replacement) – Ivanov, Medvedev or, more likely, Naryshkin. It doesn’t matter how and with what methods the siloviki bloc will be removed from the path of his departure from the Kremlin.
The West, I repeat, has already accepted all this. But will his associates? That’s where the intrigue lies. On the one hand, they won’t be coming off as losers. Entry tickets to the business side of the Olympics will be provided to the “in-crowd.” And that means that, through Sochi, they will be able to legitimize all their hard-earned gains, reducing the fear of any changes in the leadership.
But, on the other hand, it’s still a little frightening. What if things don’t turn out so well? Yes, the opposition here is useless; it can’t decide whether it’s taking money from Berezovsky or not, after all. The song, long since composed by the script specialists from the FSB, was played out by the oppositionists note-for-note in the post-Sochi week. Kasparov’s dignified indignation was smashed against the directness of Eduard Limonov: they took, they’re still taking and they’ll keep on taking. After all, the whole point in putting Limonov into the Other Russia was to use him as a mine, to detonate the whole affair.
But what if? What if the opposition somehow manages to win? Not as a result of its own successes but as a consequence of the mistakes of others. And then what? It’s a bit nervy, a bit frightening. And a question mark still hangs over the shift worker to be brought in. Medvedev is too bright and too European. Ivanov is too ambitious. Naryshkin is too crafty. There’s no simple solution to this task. Only the main shareholder is capable of controlling things of this complexity. And he’ll be hanging on to those shares and just doesn’t want to do the business of actually managing for the next four years.
Irresolvable tasks often reduce players to internal hysterics which, in turn, push them towards poorly thought-out and highly risky moves. What will happen this time? We’ll just have to wait and see. In political life, as in the Olympic movement, there’s a simple and precise slogan – the main thing isn’t winning, it’s the taking part that counts.
The opinion of the author may differ from that of the editorial board. |
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