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21.09.07
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Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Another September Surprise
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Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
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Contributors: Stephen Blank, Ethan S. Burger, Vlad Ivanenko, Eric Kraus, Andrei Lebedev, Andrei Liakhov
In what has become a September routine, Russian President Vladimir Putin, last week in an elegant and sweeping move turned the Russian political tables upside down by having his entire cabinet resign and appointing an obscure second-tier official as Russia’s new prime minister and a potential successor.
A government reshuffle was long expected, and First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov was widely rumored to succeed Fradkov as the new prime minister, which would have basically confirmed him as the candidate to beat for the presidency. Ivanov has recently hired seasoned political consultants to run his campaign operations, and rumors continue to fly that he might lead the United Russia party list for the Duma elections in December. Many Russian political analysts had a lot of egg on their faces when, despite their confident predictions, Putin bypassed Ivanov and nominated the virtually unknown Viktor Zubkov to the number two position in the Russian political hierarchy.
Putin’s logic in this move is unclear, and perhaps for the first time in his eight years in the Kremlin, it betrays his lack of confidence how to proceed with the presidential succession.
Zubkov, who has just turned 66, is the oldest serving Russian prime minister since Yevgeny Primakov. He is an effective bureaucrat, but hardly a leader of the great nation. His biggest qualification for the job is his very special relationship with Putin whom Zubkov, an experienced Communist party apparatchik, taught basic bureaucratic skills in the St. Petersburg mayor’s office in the early 1990s.
The biggest question right now is not so much the composition of the Russian cabinet, but rather the fate of the two First Deputy Prime Ministers – Ivanov and Dmitry Medvedev – who until last week, were leading contenders for the Presidency. Will they remain in the race, or bow out in deference to Putin’s choice of Zubkov, who has already announced his intention to run for president?
Is Zubkov the One? What does this tell us about the future of Russia? What does this signal about Putin’s own plans? Will Zubkov hold the presidency for Putin for a single term (or even a few months)? What will happen to Medvedev and Ivanov? Will any of them be nominated for the presidency by a leading political party in December? Will there be a multi-candidate presidential race in Russia with serious contenders running full scale campaigns? Is Putin “plotting” a democratic presidential election in Russia? What does this all mean for Russia’s relations with the West?
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Vlad Ivanenko, Ph.D. economics, Statistics Canada, Ottawa
Judging by the orderliness of the moves the Putin administration had made in the wake of transitions of power, it is unlikely that the resignation of the last government was spontaneous. Moreover, speculations of what this event implies for forecasting the name of the future Russian president appear to be unwarranted, because Putin has explained in no uncertain terms how he is going to proceed in the transition. Since his words have proved to be the best predictor of his actions in the past, let’s recall his three statements.
First, Putin stated many times that democratic governance is the future of Russia. Regardless of less benign interpretations of his moves - like the establishment of pro-Kremlin parties and repression of "non-systemic" opposition, the replacement of independent candidates with party lists or the decision to appoint governors - his main concern seems to be with imposing limitations on the excesses of political activity rather than faking its process.
Second, Putin claimed repeatedly that the next president of Russia would be a person who is well-known to voters and who has a proven record of achievements. Given that the outgoing ministers had high public profiles and opportunities to prove their worth, some of them are natural contenders for the presidency.
Finally, Putin explained that the current cabinet should not be involved in pre-electoral politics, but should focus on the day-to-day operations of the administrative apparatus to ensure a stable economic and political environment during this uneasy time.
Together, the logic of these three statements leads to the following conjuncture: Putin is serious about making elections as democratic as possible under the current conditions. The new prime minister, Zubkov, is a largely unknown figure, which makes him an unlikely contender in the opinion of voters. His relatively advanced age sends the signal to bureaucrats that he is simply a caretaker, which precludes his use of administrative resources in politics. At the same time, Zubkov is known to have potential insider information on shadowy dealings of large businesses, which is a signal not to use dirty campaign tricks, because their perpetrators will be dealt with symmetrically. On the other hand, several outgoing ministers - like Ivanov and Medvedev - are known to have presidential ambitions and are likely users of administrative resources for personal political purposes. Now this possibility is denied to them.
Ivanov and Medvedev have to make their personal decisions and either to proclaim their intentions in the open or to return to the same spots in the government. Both choices are inherently risky. If the two ex-ministers choose to compete, they have to work through the ranks of two political parties to earn presidential nominations. If they decide not to, at best they get the same positions in a provisional government and no guarantee of job tenure after May 2008.
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Andrei Liakhov, Norton Rose Law Firm, London
Ivanov will most probably run, Medvedev, with no chance of winning, most probably will be a stalking horse. The reason for this is obvious. Ivanov managed to turn the armed forces and the defense industry around. Although the reforms are far from completed, results are already visible. In contrast, Medvedev's National Projects are going nowhere, and Putin increasingly has to interfere directly, which he hates to do. Medvedev and Ivanov were given two large complex problems to solve in order to prove themselves and to learn the ropes. This is a classic Putin approach used previously on people like Boris Aleshin, Ilya Klebanov, Vladimir Yakunin and Dmitry Kozak. In the case of Ivanov and Medvedev, one is failing and one is succeeding, but only to a point - not so much as to make Ivanov the obvious choice. Ivanov's obvious weakness is financial matters - hence both the choice of his replacement as defense minister, whose first task was to do an internal audit of the Ministry of Defense, and, in my view, Zubkov, who understands cash flow, broadly speaking.
I cannot exclude the possibility that there will be a third contender, someone like Anatoly Serdyukov, who recently resigned as Defense Minister or even Kozak. Although, of course, the possibility of a completely unknown cannot be totally ruled out, my guess is that as time goes by, this is becoming less and less probable simply because any "unknown" must prove that he is capable before being allowed to run.
There is no chance Zubkov is the One. A lot of Kremlinologists will say that Zubkov's appointment is a sign of Putin’s choice, but they are mistaken, simply because Putin is not Yeltsin, whose principal concern was to exclude any chance of personal prosecution for high treason and other offences he allegedly committed while in office. Putin is not desperate, and he will not be repeating any of Yeltsin’s tricks. And of course the analysts are paid to analyze, but with no real facts, they turn to history and fantasy.
Again, it is important to remember that Putin usually does what he says he will do, and his explanation that "Zubkov would ensure a smooth transition" should be taken at face value. On a personal level, I think that he just ensures that all his friends will have a nice retirement package.
There is no chance at all that Putin will return. He looks visibly tired, particularly during the last 6 months or so, and repeatedly says that he will not return to the presidency. I understand that analysts who need to prove that Russia is an authoritarian state need to keep the "return theory" as part of the "Putin Dictator" myth, but there is not a single fact to support this theory.
Will there be a multi-candidate presidential race in Russia with serious contenders running full-scale campaigns? It increasingly looks like this is a real possibility, as long as there is no clear leader. But there is one essential qualification: all the real candidates will be from the same team and will essentially follow the current policies, at least in the first term.
It will be a democratic election as Putin and his team understand democracy. Of course the West is already prepared to declare that the elections were neither fair nor free, and I do not see any way to change the West’s mind, since no one there is interested in a free, strong, democratic Russia. But this is outside the scope of this panel.
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Ethan S. Burger, Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service, American University, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.
It would be foolish for me to speculate on the likely presidential outcome in 2008, both in Russia and the United States. There are too many variables as well as outside events that can change the situation. There are also many more qualified individuals.
What I find more interesting is the historic and legal implication of the current events. Zubkov is currently an unknown commodity to the Russian electorate. His prior experience does not suggest that he has the experience to be a highly effective prime minister, but in the Russian governmental system, this is not very important. Only being liked by President Putin seems to matter.
Fradkov was also a surprise choice as prime minister. While he did not standout in a positive sense – Russia's domestic problems in terms of quality of life remain – he has not been a disaster.
I think that any improvements in quality of life (life expectancy, quality of education, housing, levels of crime, and preparation for future crises) are the best way to judge a government's effectiveness.
Having good macro-economic data is important, but Russia has recently been rated highly in terms of balance of payments and budgetary surplus, although this has been largely due to high energy prices. At the same time, Russia has 4 of the ten worst environmental sites in the world. So what is the basis for making a judgment as to whether a country is performing well?
I note that during the Yeltsin era, despite his personal unpopularity, he had credible individuals serving as prime minister – Yevgeny Primakov and Viktor Chernomyrdin. They had credentials that no one could deny. The same cannot be said of Zubkov.
I note the demise of the significance of the State Duma and Federation Council as a branch of government that exercises real power. Zubkov was approved 397-3, I believe. In contrast, Chernomyrdin was not approved on the first vote, but the president won the game of chicken since the Duma deputies did not want to risk new Duma elections.
During the Yeltsin years elections for the State Duma mattered. Even the 1999 elections were heavily contested. There was real political debate and opposition to governmental parties. This has largely disappeared. The changes in the election law make the Duma less significant. The 7 percent threshold for getting into the Duma will prevent important individuals from having a platform to express their views. In most developed democracies, the political parties pick the prime minister – but not in Russia.
Today the most significant Russian parties stand for little besides the status quo and themselves. That is a shame. It does not fulfill the promise of the Russian Constitution.
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Andrei Lebedev, Senior Associate, the State Club Foundation, Moscow
Making the capable technocrat Viktor Zubkov head of the Russian government can be interpreted, as numerous political pundits have stated, in many different ways. However, at least one of these ways, in my opinion, has been overlooked.
Of course Zubkov will hardly aspire to the presidency himself in 2008. It’s not 1999, the political situation is incomparably more stable and does not call for raising a candidate heretofore virtually unknown to highest power. Therefore, he is meant to stay after March 2008 – possibly for 4 years, lending effective support to the next Russian president. Otherwise it would have been senseless to change prime ministers half a year before the presidential election; there simply is not enough time to carry out anything grand.
This tells us something about the style of government for the next power cycle. Judging by the first public declarations of the previously mum Zubkov, he is going to be very decisive in installing law and order. One of the evident directions of his activity will be fighting corruption. Defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov’s resignation is an example: nepotism is an important part of the base for corruption, and the new prime minster made it clear he will not favor “labor dynasties” within government service. A member of the government team is being sacrificed in the name of high principles. This should be followed by an active campaign to eradicate nepotism and corruption in high places, otherwise, this high principle is discredited.
Further on, sacrificing an effective minister – and most experts agree Serdyukov has proved his effectiveness – means that there is a replacement ready. It may happen to appear as unexpected as Serdyukov and Zubkov’s appointments, but it would confirm the existence of a long enough “reserve bench,” which has been in doubt throughout the years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency.
Whether those sitting on the “reserve bench” are effective enough remains to be seen.
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Eric Kraus, Managing Director, Anyatta Capital, advisor to the Nikitsky Russia/CIS Opportunities Fund
Predictions are dangerous, especially when they involve the future; any analyst with egg on his face should have known better than to spin falsifiable predictions on the basis of little more than fantasy and conjecture. One must never be vague when one can be ambiguous.
The Kremlin has a Plan, and it is overwhelmingly likely that the Kremlin will execute this plan successfully – after the typical flailing about, confusing and contradictory declarations, and general lack of spin-management skills which characterizes Russian governance – the chess masters undoubtedly continue to think several moves ahead.
Zubkov may well be the anointed one, though it seems unlikely. After a long succession of decrepit old men – Andropov, Brezhnev, the late Yeltsin – it has been rejuvenating for the Russians to see a man with pectorals and a steady, steely gaze in the presidency. It seems far more likely that Zubkov will serve as a bridge between Putin and his successor, guaranteeing continuity, but especially putting the fear of God into the heart of any oligarch who might otherwise feel tempted to raid the feeding trough during the changing of the guard.
I have always been willing to wager that the eventual announcement of the heir-apparent would be greeted by a universal cry of “WHO?” and that there are only about four Russian citizens who can be safely excluded – the current front-runners. Even that is uncertain, but it would be unlike President Putin to do what was expected of him.
Certainly, to assume that Putin would allow a horse race between two or more candidate is to imagine that he will leave the succession issue to fate, with the danger that the new president would establish an independent power base and rejects Putin’s tutelage.
Even if one of the gang of four were to be anointed, it is unlikely that anyone outside the Kremlin would have much of an inkling of who it will be before hand – in Russia especially, idle hands are the devil’s playthings, and the speculation will continue unabated until mid-December.
If we assume that Putin has indeed found a way to retain the powers of the presidency while momentarily relinquishing the office (which he would only do for reasons best known to himself. Certainly, with an 80 percent approval rating, the most “democratic” solution would have been for him to remain in his current job) then the interesting questions become not those of personality, but rather of the sustainability of the Putin System – whether this carefully balanced mix of moderate nationalism, diplomatic assertiveness, and a mixed economic model involving a blend of primitive capitalism and economic dirigisme will prevail.
Equally, a more fruitful discussion would be to examine how the current government structure will be modified in order to provide a suitable position for Putin, and whether personal loyalty alone will provide a sufficient limitation on the potential ambitions of the successor. The real question is what his next position is going to be, and how this will alter the structure of the Russian government.
Finally, perhaps the most neglected question has been the direction in policy that this nomination represents. Zubkov intends to address two of the main failings of recent years – corruption in state bureaucracy and the misery of Russia’s countryside. For these limited but vital goals, he seems an excellent choice. Zubkov grew up in an impoverished village and subsequently managed a kolkhoz; his expressed concern with the poverty in the regions is doubtlessly sincere. Furthermore, he won his credentials in the money-laundering area, and his honesty has never been in question. This renders him eminently suitable for his new role.
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Stephen Blank, The U.S. Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA
(Dr. Blank’s views as contributed to Russia Profile do not represent the position of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the U.S. Government)
Most, if not all of the commentary on Zubkov's appointment is speculation, because only one man may know what it means and he isn't talking. Fradkov was clearly an ineffectual prime minister, since several ministers openly disagreed on economic policy in public. But beyond that, until the new cabinet is fully constituted and presented to the public, we cannot know for sure who won and who lost. One key would be if Gref and Kudrin are out of the new cabinet, since that would signify a victory for the Siloviki faction.
My own hunch is that Putin is trying to retain his power up to the last possible minute and will not announce a presidential choice until after the results of the Duma election are in. This is because it will tell him who might be the best candidate from the point of view of the public mood, the constitution of the Duma and the performance of the new government. Otherwise, everything is speculation except for the fact that these changes and indicate that the succession issue and all of its ramifications are the Achilles’ heel of the system and must be so in a system of personalized power. Furthermore, as long as this system continues, Russia's relations with the West will be precarious and its performance as a state will, even under the best of conditions, be sub-optimal. To justify this statement, it is only necessary to look at the continuing and rising volume of official corruption and seeming unconcern over the demographic catastrophe. |
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