|
|
|
|
|
|
26.10.07
|
Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Putin In Iran
|
|
|
Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
|
Contributors: Stephen Blank, Ethan S. Burger, Sergei Shishkarev
Russian President, Vladimir Putin went to Iran last week to attend a summit of the leaders of Caspian states, but the real objective of his talks in Tehran went well beyond any discussion on the delimitation of the Caspian seabed.
Putin hoped to broker a deal on the Iranian nuclear program by making the Iranians agree to the Russian proposal of a joint fuel enrichment center in Russia. Iran would then have to freeze its enrichment activities at Natanz and maintain only a symbolic enrichment capability for research purposes. This would have the effect of halting the progress of the Iranian military nuclear program, while allowing Iran and other states to claim that the right to peaceful nuclear energy, guaranteed under the non-proliferation treaty, is observed.
Iran has been lukewarm to last year's Russian proposal, but this time Moscow had some new arguments. The United States, the UK and France were pushing for a new set of sanctions on Iran to be imposed by the UN Security Council, while Russia and Germany were finding it hard to resist the pressure.
Two weeks before his trip, Putin sent former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov on a “private trip” to Tehran to test the waters. It appears that Primakov was unable to secure a breakthrough in his talks and Putin had to rely on his persuasive powers to steer Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad toward a more accommodating position.
Whether Putin succeeded in this remains to be seen. The substance of his talks on the nuclear issue is a closely held secret. We will soon be able to see whether the Iranian intransigence has in any way been diminished by Putin’s personal push. But what is clear from this is that the Russian leadership is seriously looking for ways to find a satisfactory solution to the increasing international standoff over the Iranian nuclear program.
Will Putin succeed where others failed have with Ahmadinejad? Will his efforts meet with due recognition in the West? What drives Putin’s mediating effort? Would Russia abandon its support for Iran if Ahmadinejad proved to be uninterested in a reasonable compromise?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sergei Shishkarev, Deputy Chairman, State Duma Committee on Energy, Transportation and Communications
Since the late 1990s, Iran has moved from being a major irritant to a major area of cooperation between Russia and the United States. The transformation has been quite significant.
In the 1990s, fledgling U.S.-Russia cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy and space was frequently disrupted by U.S. suspicions over alleged Russian missile and nuclear technology sales to Iran. Today, Russia has tightened and enforced its export control policies and the issue of illegal missile and nuclear technology exports has been removed from the bilateral agenda.
After Russia introduced the spent fuel take-back requirement and offered its enrichment services to halt the Iranian enrichment program, the United States reversed itself on peaceful nuclear energy in Iran, enlisting Russia’s help to create incentives for Iran to abandon its quest for nuclear weapons. Of course, Russia supported two UN Security Council resolutions imposing punitive sanctions on Iran and Iranian entities.
This change in the U.S. view of Russia’s role in Iran has allowed both sides to conclude a bilateral peaceful nuclear energy cooperation agreement, an achievement that looked unattainable in the late 1990s.
President Putin wants to defend Russia’s interests in Iran, which include maintaining a largely cooperative relationship with an important neighbor that can, if it wanted to, seriously damage the interests of Russia or Russia’s allies. He also seeks to achieve a viable diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue that could destabilize the region.
It is clear that Russia does not want to provide Iran with nuclear fuel until Iran gives sufficient assurances that Iran would abandon those aspects of the program that could ensure rapid construction of a bomb. Following his visit to Tehran, Putin appears to have told Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert that Russia would not supply the fuel to the Bushehr reactor until and unless the permanent members of the UN Security council plus Germany and the IAEA obtain those assurances.
Putin wants to be effective on Iran. Whether he succeeds depends also on the Iranian leadership.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ethan S. Burger, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service, American University, Washington, D.C.
In the late 1970s, then-Rand Corporate Analyst William Quandt wrote a study of the potential impact of nuclear proliferation on the Soviet Union. He came to the conclusion that the majority of the countries most likely to develop nuclear weapons (such as Iran and South Korea) considered Russia to be its primary, secondary or tertiary target. Russian national security officials should obtain a copy and read it.
It would appear that Putin and his foreign policy advisors are playing with fire. I doubt the geopolitical situation has changed in the last 29 years. I feel that it is irresponsible and short-sighted for the Russian leadership to assume otherwise. Hopes of creating an OPEC-like entity for natural gas may enrich certain segments of the Russian elite, but have numerous dangerous consequences for Russia and the world.
Despite Putin's assertion to the contrary, Iran is NOT Russia's natural ally and specialists in the field both in Russia and abroad understand this. It has the potential to spread its influence to Central Asia, and it supports the foreign extremist groups that support Chechen autonomy or independence. These terrorist groups could explode small nuclear or dirty bombs in a major Russian city. To forget the risks of "blowback," reflects a limited understanding of the world and history.
I would always want to assume that there is some logic - as opposed to opportunism or viewing the world as a zero sum game in its desire to place Russia as a significant power - behind Russian foreign policy. I favor a decoupling of political and economic interests in most cases. I can accept that I will not favor numerous Russian actions, but in the case of Iran, it is difficult for me to discern any long-term benefits for Russia.
In recent months, one of the few positive developments in Iran has been manifestations of political opposition to Iranian President Ahmadinejad: the victory of opposition parties in local elections, protests by university students, former Iranian President, Mohammed Khatami indicating that he was contemplating a return to politics in order to oust Ahmadinejad, whose programs are harming the Iranian people in the short-term. A neutral, self-interested Iran is a goal that the world should be promoting.
In a recent conference held at McGill University, Canadian Member of Parliament and former Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler raised the issue of whether the Iranian president should be deemed an international criminal under the U.N. Prevention of Genocide Convention and other international agreements. While Iran may not be a signatory to the relevant agreements, the Iranian president's announced intent to wipe Israel from the face the map -- which will certainly trigger a retaliatory strike against Tehran and other Arab countries, could also result in both a world war and a global depression. Such a possibility can only be described as an irresponsible threat to peace deserving immediate action. In countries that prohibit hate or extremist speech, the Iranian president should not be given platforms to spread his venom - he should be arrested and tried, presidential immunity aside.
Obviously, I was not a party to Putin's discussion with Ahmadinejad. Sometimes, the carrot-and-stick policy may work, but I doubt it will with an individual such as Iran's president. Russian foreign policy should not emulate Soviet foreign policy in 1939 - it is impossible to forget the consequences.
Coddling an increasingly unpopular ruler in Iran demonstrates that Russia does not seek to become a respected member of the world international community, nor is it placing itself on what inevitably will be the winning side in Iran (albeit, at an unfortunately high cost). Russia may have great natural resources, and the industrial nations will not yet treat it like a pariah nation, but supporters of a new cold war are not sounding as absurd as they might have during 2002-2004.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Professor Stephen Blank, The US Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA
(Dr. Blank’s views as contributed to Russia Profile do not represent the position of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the U.S. Government).
Perhaps Russia is looking for a satisfactory solution, but it does so in strange ways. It tells France it has no evidence of a nuclear program and Jewish leaders that Russia and Israel are strategic partners on Iran. Publicly as well, Moscow opposes sanctions and pressure on Iran. Naturally, Iran is less than convinced by Moscow's efforts to attack and befriend Washington at the same time. And in any case, it seems clear that the current drift in Iranian politics is towards a more hard line on the nuclear issue, as seen in the resignation of Iranian security council secretary, Ali Larijani. As long as Putin sells Iran weapons, publicly defends Iran and attacks Washington's missile defenses, Iran has no compelling reason to listen to him and stop its program. If Moscow were to join the sanctions and stop its efforts to retain an Iranian ally at the risk of antagonizing all of the West, perhaps Tehran would listen. But neither a cessation of Russia's efforts to hunt with the hounds and run with the hares or of Iran's nuclear program or of concerted European action against it beyond innocuous sanctions seems likely anytime soon. |
| The source |
|
|
|
|
|
|
The virtual community for English-speaking expats and Russians
