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16.11.07
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Is Russia Behind An Orange Revolution In Georgia?
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Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
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Contributors: Stephen Blank, Ethan S. Burger, James George Jatras, Eugene Kolesnikov, Darren Spinck, Ira Straus
For two weeks Georgia’s opposition has been staging massive street protests demanding the resignation of the country’s president Mikheil Saakashvili. The opposition, composed of a rag tag coalition of small parties that share little common agenda other than Saakashvili’s resignation, also demanded that a regular parliamentary election be held in the spring of 2008, opposing Saakashvili’s decision to postpone it till the fall of 2008.
Georgia’s president initially tried to ignore the street protests, but as they grew in scale, spread to other Georgian cities and drew the support of prominent Georgian exiles like former Defense Minister Iraqli Okruashvili, who from his safe haven in Germany repeated his charges against Saakashvili, accusing him of corruption and ordering the killing of former Prime-Minister Zurab Zhvania, Saakashvili was forced to act.
On November 7, riot police and the military were used to disband the opposition rallies, and martial law was imposed with a corresponding crackdown on opposition media. Saakashvili also accused Russia of covertly acting to promote unrest in Georgia, and produced tapes of telephone conversations between some opposition leaders and Russian Embassy officials. Georgia expelled three Russian diplomats, while Russia reciprocated with the same number of diplomatic expulsions.
Saakashvili also went on the offensive by announcing in a televised address on the evening of November 8 that preterm presidential elections will be held on January 5, 2008, together with a referendum to determine whether the next parliamentary elections should be held in the spring or the fall of 2008. Saakashvili explained that by bringing forward the date of the presidential ballot (due only in early January 2009), he is giving the opposition the chance "to be chosen by the people." Holding the presidential ballot in January 2008 rather than in the fall, as Saakashvili earlier demanded, precludes the participation of former Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili, who will turn 35 (the minimum age for a presidential candidate) only on November 6, 2008. Saakashvili also accused several key opposition figures of treason and conspiring with a foreign power to depose a constitutional government.
Saakashivili’s crackdown on opposition was met with strong criticism in the West. In a statement posted on November 8 on the NATO website, Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that, "the imposition of Emergency Rule, and the closure of media outlets in Georgia, a Partner with which the Alliance has an intensified dialogue, are of particular concern and not in line with Euro-Atlantic values." Amnesty International and Transparency International issued separate statements on November 8 deploring the police brutality and the media crackdown. The U.S. State Department spokesman decried Saakashvili’s actions while denying any knowledge of Russia’s involvement in assisting opposition actions in Gerogia.
It is clear that Saakashvili has upstaged the opposition by scheduling an early presidential election, for which the latter is unprepared. And it is likely that he will retain his post as the country’s president.
But the question remains – was Russia in any way involved in fermenting the unrest in Georgia and mobilizing the opposition that almost succeeded in brining down the pro-American president that Moscow so much disliked? Has Russia the capability and the resources to help stage its own version of an orange revolution in a post-Soviet state? Or is Moscow simply benefiting from a swell of genuine popular discontent against a leader who has clearly overstepped his boundaries? How will the West react to the opposition’s victory in Georgia? Will the new political regime be pro-Russian or continue the pro-Western and pro-NATO policies that Saakashvili introduced in 2004? How would Russia benefit from such a change in regime?
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Eugene Kolesnikov, Private Consultant, the Netherlands
There is no Russian hand in the Georgian uprising. Key opposition leaders are as much or more anti-Russian than Mikheil Saakashvili. Besides, Russia is quite worried that Saakashvili may try to provoke military conflict with Abkhazia or South Ossetia to disrupt the political process and preserve his power. Since there is no real challenge to Georgia's anti-Russian policy, the United States is more concerned about the democratic fa?ade of the regime and its manageability, trying to keep tabs on the events in Georgia.
Russia and the United States are responsible for this crisis in a complex way, because Georgia is an unfortunate victim of the implosion of the Soviet empire, and the continuing geopolitical shifts that accompany the establishment of a new world power order.
The collapse of the Soviet Union unleashed pent-up nationalism that sparked the secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, causing Georgia to lose control over these territories in 1992.
Georgian elites hoped to restore the larger Georgia and develop its economy by becoming an American protectorate. The United States embraced Georgia as a key member of the anti-Russian cordon being built likewise with Turkey, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine. Georgia retaliated by becoming a cold sore for Russia in the south, acting as a convenient base for Chechen separatists. This policy achieved high points in 2001, when GUAM was formed, and in 2002, when construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline began.
The election of Mikheil Saakashvili as Georgia’s president in January 2004, following the Rose Revolution, was welcomed by Georgians, who hoped for restoration of dignity, order and prosperity, and by the West, who saw him as a more democratic and unconditionally pro-western leader.
From that point on, however, the “success story” of a vehemently pro-western and staunchly anti-Russian Georgia started crumbling. Georgia's anti-Russian policies and its sprint toward NATO membership met with the stone wall of Russian resistance and increasing western concern about uncontrolled military escalation of frozen ethnic conflicts. Extensive western support of Georgia did not translate into economic prosperity for the ordinary Georgians and political stability for the country. On the contrary, Saakashvili's regime quickly degenerated into crude authoritarianism and lost its internal legitimacy. Blatant persecution of opposition, forceful break-up of popular protests and imposition of the state of emergency also largely destroyed its external legitimacy granted by the West.
Regardless of the events in the next three months leading to the presidential elections in Georgia, it will remain an anti-Russian American protectorate, and will thus continue to be a victim of the clash between Western and Russian geopolitical interests in the Caucasus. This clash is more complex and severe now that Russia has regained its strength and assertiveness. An effective solution to Georgian problems, to a large degree depends on the developments in the Russia-West relationship and the resulting power configuration in the region. These geopolitical aspects are not likely to be settled for many years. Therefore, the only variable over which Georgians have some control is a (rather small) opportunity to take matters in their own hands and establish a legitimate government that can start working in earnest on the restoration of dignity, order and prosperity of the Georgian people.
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Ethan S. Burger, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, & Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service, American University, Washington, D.C.
The violence in Tblisi, Georgia (and Islamabad, Pakistan) seems to be yet another example of the long-term consequences of giving an individual political leader a carte blanche. To deny the existence of a legitimate domestic opposition to Saakashvilli would be to ignore reality -- power has gone to his head, and having a law degree from Colombia University does not prepare one to run a country. Maturity is the art of reconciling oneself with reality; Saakiashvili has not shown such maturity. I would be surprised if Russia were not fanning the flames of the demonstrators in Tblisi. Among other things, its overseas operatives are paid to support friendly domestic forces (as are those of other states).
There is a difference between having the desire and capability to achieve regime change (e.g. the United States in Guatemala and Iran, and the Soviet Union in Poland and Romania last century) and the ability to aid and abet a legitimate domestic political opposition, hoping that the country's ruler steps down (e.g. the United States with respect to Pakistan today). Of course, the latter is a form of interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state.
This principle gives rise to issues such as intent, type/level of activities, and capabilities. Are state controlled radio and television directed abroad not a form of interference? If so, as long as it is factual (i.e. reporting and analysis) and not incitement, few would disagree that it is not permissible under international law.
Most countries with interests abroad interfere in the domestic affairs of other sovereign countries to some degree. Even a private or semi-private company's decision to locate a factory in one region of a county rather than another has an impact on the domestic affairs of the "host" country in the area of foreign investment.
Most countries' foreign policies are directed at advancing their own interests -- there is no reason to expect Russia to do otherwise. National interests include economic and strategic interests (even the foreign policy of benign countries like Canada and Sweden are in furtherance of their perceived national interests).
Of course, all governments must accommodate the desires of domestic interest groups. When humanitarian interests coincide with these, all the better. At times, certain individuals (e.g. former President Jimmy Carter and Woodrow Wilson) have an atypical agenda (promotion of human rights and self-determination of nationalities), but they are the exception and not the rule.
What is most unfortunate about Russia’s foreign policy is its overwhelming focus on the short-term, and the desire to re-assert itself on the world stage. Russia needs to take responsible actions in order to be accepted by the EU and the United States, otherwise it may find itself facing major problems with two nuclear nations whose governments must restrain religious extremists (Pakistan, and soon Iran -- unless something dramatic happens) on its southern border, a less friendly Central Asia, and a resurgent and aggressive China. Thus the risk that Russia will cease to exist east of the Urals if the demographic status quo doesn’t change.
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James George Jatras, Principal, Squire Sanders Public Advocacy, LLC, Director, American Council for Kosovo, Washington
Not too long ago, "democracy" in Georgia (or in Ukraine, or in Kyrgyzstan, or tomorrow maybe in Russia), was a simple matter of a diagnosis by western governments and media of what "the people" wanted, and that was that. Evidently a uniform, undifferentiated mass speaking with one voice, thinking with one mind, yearning with one heart, a.k.a. "the people," (whose triumph over whom, an anti-people?) was itself part of a grand drama: the unstoppable march of all humanity into the radiant future of global democracy.
As it happens, real life turned out to be more complicated. The anointed helmsman, in Georgia's case, Mikheil Saakashvili, steering "the people" to the Promised Land flowing with milk and honey, is not necessarily as universally adored as the revolutionary myth would suggest. Nor has the supposed triumph of democracy turned out to be the anticipated great leap forward into an era of social peace and harmony, or the utopia of "Euro-Atlantic integration" into the EU and NATO.
No one should be happy about the strife in Georgia today. But if there's a silver lining, it's that the west's simplistic adulation of Saakashvili and his regime seems to be wearing off, even in Washington. This is in sharp contrast to the mindless cheerleading that followed the Rose Revolution, with Saakashvili's western admirers ignoring even such outrages as the kangaroo court trial and conviction of Maia Topuria and her codefendants on treason charges for a non-existent conspiracy to launch an armed insurrection -- a plot hatched in Moscow, of course. Now, as then, Saakashvili and his defenders have an easy answer for any opposition: it's stirred up by Russian agents. In an earlier era, another Georgian helmsman blamed all shortcomings on "wreckers" in the pay of the "international bourgeoisie." Thankfully, the physical consequences today are quite different, which indeed is progress.
The fact that western governments don't seem to be buying it probably surprises Saakashvili more than anyone. What has changed?
First, it would be nice if even false charges could be given at least some plausible basis. Given how divided, and not particularly pro-Russian, the opposition is, we have what in America is called failing the laugh test. Second, just as the American hand in the Rose Revolution was hardly invisible, it is difficult to believe Moscow has become so adept at political technologies that no one in Tbilisi has been able to expose even a trace of Russian involvement.
This doesn't mean that a regime change in Georgia is not on the Kremlin's agenda. Given the premises and promises with which Saakashvili came to power, especially NATO membership, it could hardly be otherwise. But that doesn't translate into Russia being behind the unrest. It is enough that, contrary to the revolutionary myth of popular unity, Georgia is a real country, with real problems, and real divisions. As the Rose mirage fades, that underlying reality is coming forth.
It is considered unlikely that Saakashvili will be unhorsed in January. Be that as it may, some sort of political transition is inevitable over the next few months. What form that will take cannot be predicted with certainty, but this much is clear: the morality play of "the people" (pro-Saakashvili, pro-west) vanquishing the anti-people (pro-Russia) is finished. Georgia will have to find a center of gravity that accommodates both contending domestic forces and Georgia's geo-strategic realities. Among other things, that means Georgia will not become a member of NATO, which certainly is a victory for Russia. But if, as seems possible, Washington is also beginning to wake up and smell the coffee, they might see that abandonment of such a gratuitous, unrealistic, and destabilizing prospect is a gain for America too.
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Ira Straus, US Coordinator, Committee on Russia in NATO
In theory it is almost inevitable that Russia must have played some kind of supportive role in the Georgian demonstrations against Saakashvili, just as it was inevitable that the United States would play a supportive role in the Ukrainian Orange Revolution. At the same time, the role in both cases has been secondary, compared to the major forces that are making history in each country.
More significant is the American-Western reaction to the events in Georgia and its contrast to the Russian reaction over Ukraine.
The West condemned the Georgian government for its crackdown and encouraged early elections. Russia, however, encouraged the repressive options of the Ukrainian government, not only during the Orange Revolution but in the years leading up to it, and opposed any honest count of the election results.
Western comments on Georgia defused, at this stage at least, the crisis there, and prevented any crisis with Russia. During the Ukrainian events, Russia fostered a crisis with the West at nearly every stage, and has continued fanning a spirit of crisis with the West over the Ukraine ever since.
The official West denied the existence of any evidence of Russian involvement in the Georgian events, even if this comment is generous or speculative at this stage. Russia played up every hint and fact of U.S. involvement in the Ukrainian events -- most of it open, undisguised support for training in campaigning and accurate election monitoring, along with some training in keeping protests peaceful -- and spun it into a web of belief in a U.S. conspiracy, that somehow controlled the vote of the Ukrainian majority and the subsequent determination of Ukrainian masses to get their votes counted honestly.
The denial in the West of Russia's role does not mean that Russia was not involved. What it means is that the West, far from looking at the hints or evidence of traces of Russian involvement, is not interested in devil theories blaming it all on Russia; rather it is interested in relieving the internal situation in Georgia.
It used to be the case that both sides were at fault for failing to consider each other’s interests during political flare-ups in the CIS space, and for viewing the involvement of the other from a zero-sum angle as directed against itself. This continues to be the case in the abstract, but the balance of blame has shifted heavily to one side.
The pro-democracy instincts of the United States lead to small and usually legitimate involvement, and rarely to heavy-handed interference. The democratic instincts may be naive at times but they are na?ve in a sincere way. The United States and NATO showed once again their sincerity in upholding universal liberal principles by denouncing the Georgian government's actions and pushing it to call for new elections. When there are double standards on the Western side -- as occurs only on some occasions, not whenever Russia cries "double standards" as happens on all occasions -- they too are, in most cases, sincere, sometimes woefully sincere and naive. And sometimes they are legitimate from a standpoint of the security of democracy in the world or the requirements for its successful long-term evolution; just as the double standards of parents are legitimate in guiding children safely to their maturity and keeping adult society afloat in the meantime.
The counter-revolutionary mood of the current Russian government, by contrast, leads to heavy handed intervention. It is scornful of democratic principle, which it wants to dismiss as a disguise for selfish Western interests. This gives it a kind of cynical pride in putting its own selfish interests above any abstract principles: it is unprincipled on principle. This, in turn, leaves it with no guiding principle to limit its interventions or re-entrust the locals with their own affairs, except the principle of solidly dependent clientele relations -- and, perhaps, the principle of avoidance of any Western-approved democracy.
The West has taken a principled stand in favor of democratic norms against "its" man Saakashvili. Several years earlier it took a principled stand accepting the appointment of Yanukovich as premier in Ukraine. One would wish that at least some people in Moscow would see that this means that their suspicions of Western motives and principles are grossly unfounded.
In particular, it means:
Western democratic principles are not a mere disguise for Western interests, even less a disguise for mere enmity and damage to Russian interests. The West is usually willing to uphold its democratic principles in the CIS area even when it increases Russian influence or (what is not, or should not be, the same thing) weakens Western influence. If the principles are often used in conjunction with Western interests, sometimes justly sometimes unjustly, this is cause for a dialogue with the West to get fairer regard for Russian interests.
The West is not revolutionary in its “democratization” in the CIS space, despite the attachment of many Westerners to a language of revolution; rather it has worked hard to convince its friends within democratic movements to stick to peaceful tactics. In the course of the brief period of the Orange events, its most significant actual intervention - distinct from its open long-term educational programs - was to pressure the protesters to remain peaceful. In Georgia it has on past occasions urged Saakashvili to cool it in his spats with Russia, and on the present occasion to ease up on his Jacobin tendencies.
The West is usually fanatical in its “democratization.” It has learned from recent failures in the Middle East. Much of the West is begging to agree with Russia's view that it should not impose early full-scale democratic elections in countries that are likely to vote Islamist extremists into power - something that obviously is not the case in Russia, Ukraine, or Georgia. Russia should welcome this; instead of looking for another opportunity to complain about "double standards" (the complaints themselves are far more hypocritical in this case than the behavior of the West), Russia should take the opportunity to resume a constructive dialogue with the West about how and where to apply democratic principles.
Free elections provide an objective standard for defusing tensions, both within individual CIS countries and between Russia and the West in their tugs of war over some countries. That is because they are a domestic legitimizing principle that is almost universally recognized in the OSCE space, despite the Russian regime's reversals on the subject. Further, they have, for back-up arbitration, international OSCE monitoring -- the closest thing available to objective monitoring, with adequate roots in long established stable democracies, despite Russia's reversion to resentment of this. Indeed, they are the only significant legitimizing principle available, notwithstanding all Russia's attempts to sponsor a Legitimism of Continuity of Power in its place. The Continuity of Power has proved a deeply subjective criterion, dependent entirely on the power that is interpreting it and weak on means of determining and legitimizing actual transitions of power; experience has also shown that it leads to destabilizing attempts at anti-constitutional coups by an existing power that is running out of actual legitimacy. If Russia genuinely seeks stability in the CIS space, it would welcome the availability of the electoral principle and monitoring.
One cannot help but notice Russia's glee in being able to appeal to a democratic principle against Saakashvili, not to mention the effort to compare this with the Orange Revolution. At the same time, one cannot help but notice the cynicism of it on the Russian part. The cynicism is misplaced. It would be better if Russia would put aside its polemical mood and notice the positive general conclusions that can be drawn from its appeal to democratic principles in the present case.
None of this is to say that democratic principles are a cure-all. If once again agreed between Russia and the West, they would defuse many Russia-West tensions in the CIS space, but would also leave many intact and could occasionally create new ones. Democracy and objective rules can facilitate diplomacy, and reduce somewhat the vast scope of problems it has to deal with. A more adequate Russia-West diplomacy in turn would enable democracy to work better in countries in the CIS space such as Ukraine that are being torn between the opposite tugs and pulls of Russia and the West. Democracy is not a substitute for diplomacy; both are needed.
It continues to be the case that Russia and the West ought to consult with one another about politics in the CIS space. If they really want to reconcile, this will have to be heavy-duty consultation, treating such matters as: trying to reconcile their clientele lists in each country; trying to get the moderate wings of their clientele to work together where possible (this would have meant in the last couple years, e.g., Russia getting Yanukovych to cooperate in good faith as Premier with Yuschenko as President; unfortunately the opposite happened); and trying to do deals with each other when they both have legitimate real or perceived interests at stake.
Unfortunately, this kind of fundamental diplomacy has almost never taken place between Russia and the West. Even when the mood was better in the 1990s, it didn't happen; it is one of the reasons why the 1991 opportunity for a much better relationship was not realized and the relations instead gradually deteriorated again. Today, the mood on both sides, principled-democratic, with a tinge of revolutionary taste on the one hand, unprincipled on principle and counterrevolutionary on the other, makes it even more unlikely.
In its absence, we are left with democratic principle -- the old-fashioned, moderate, OSCE-verified kind -- as the main means available for defusing Russia-West tensions over CIS countries and providing an objective standard for the two sides to repair to. It is encouraging that Russia has appealed to the principle in the present case, out of self-interest, and found that the principle has worked. This immediately implies an important logical conclusion: that Russia has an interest in the principle per se. Is it able to draw this logical conclusion? The answer could serve as an indicator of whether its counterrevolutionary posture is a conjectural mood or an entrenched ideology.
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Professor Stephen Blank, the US Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA
As of November 11, there is no evidence supporting the claim that Russia is behind the unrest in Georgia. But there is little doubt that it benefits from it, because this will weaken Georgia internally, even though it is unlikely that a pro-Moscow government will be put back in place in the elections in January. Muscovite interference therefore remains to be proven. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Moscow has tried and can try again to overthrow recalcitrant governments in the former Soviet Union or at least to destabilize them. Its activities in April-May 2007 in Estonia, and the recent revelations of Russian cash being funneled to Latvian political figures, exemplify this process.
But Russian interference does not end there. We need only remember the $300 million Moscow spent along with sending teams of political technologists to Ukraine in 2004, and even assassination attempts against Niyazov in 2002 in that abortive coup. The poisoning of Yushchenko in 2004 also remains to be explained. And there were real cases of earlier interference in Georgia.
Thus Moscow is now benefiting from a groundswell of internal opposition in Georgia, but if it reaches the point of unseating the ruling government, Georgian politics will likely be more fractured and corrupt than under Saakashvili, and here the figure of Badri Patakaratshvili will emerge to play a role that seems common in post-Soviet and unstable regimes of businessmen of shadowy connections, origins and agendas. Undoubtedly NATO will accept a democratic election outcome in Georgia whatever it is, and there is little likelihood of a pro-Moscow regime coming fourth. But a weaker Georgia allows for Russia to pursue more points of leverage against it in the future.
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Darren Spinck, Principal, Global Strategic Communications Group, Washington, D.C.
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has repeatedly blamed Russia for orchestrating the latest public demonstrations against his government, but even traditionally Russophobic western media outlets, such as The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal, have not parroted his misrepresentations. The latest unrest in Georgia is a result of the country being led by “democrats without democracy,” as one London analyst termed the Saakashvili regime as far back as 2005. It has become a clich? to say that the Rose Revolution has wilted and there is no one to blame but Saakashvili and his corrupt cohorts.
When he seized power in 2004, Saakashvili quickly became the darling of the west, the symbol of U.S.-assisted democracy promotion in the former Soviet Union, and a poster-boy for NATO expansion. But during his four year reign, he has systematically squashed Georgia’s political opposition, imposed a form of super-presidentialism granting Saakashvili far more authority than most executive branches in western democracies, and turned the “independent” judicial branch into a rubber-stamp of the President’s office.
Even pro-NATO expansion academic Taras Kuzio questioned Georgia’s readiness for NATO membership, writing in an April 18 Kyiv Post op-ed, “The US and EU supported the Rose Revolution in Georgia believing it would lead to a democratic breakthrough after a decade of stagnation under Eduard Shevardnadze. Yet, there are troubling developments that would suggest that democratic progress is under threat in Georgia.”
Recent opposition demonstrations in Georgia are the culmination of four years of Saakashvili centralizing his grip on power. Many western media outlets and policy makers blindly trusted Saakashvili when he blamed Russia for a planned coup d’etat following the September 2006 arrests of Justice party leader Maia Topuria and twelve other opposition politicians. Topuria’s trial was closed to the public, denying the world an opportunity to witness how Georgia’s judicial system is pressured by the executive branch. As expected, Topuria was sentenced to eight and a half years in prison for crimes she could not have possibly committed.
This was not Saakahsvili’s first, nor his last, reign of terror against the Georgian opposition. In December 2004, Tinatin Khidasheli, chairwoman of the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association, wrote of similar acts of aggression toward those who disagreed with him, including the arrest of an opposition journalist on trumped-up drug charges and a warrant-less search of a Member of Parliament’s home, which resulted in police conveniently finding a weapons cache in his children’s closet. More recently, a former chairman of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, Ana Dolidze, condemned the Saakashvili government for not investigating attacks on government critics such as Gia Khukhashvili, Irakli Imnaishvili, and Valeri Gelashvili and for not arresting police officers accused of “[taking] part in extrajudicial killings of 37 youths during the last two years.”
Even the U.S. government has taken shots at Saakashvili, with the State Department acknowledging that “serious problems remained” regarding Georgia’s human rights progress, and Assistant U.S. Secretary of State Matthew Bryza demanding an end to Georgia’s current state of emergency.
Quite simply, these protests were bound to happen and the groundswell of discontent should shock no one. What is shocking and must be addressed are the lengths Saakashvili has gone to in order to consolidate his power. Saakashvili may walk and talk like a democrat, but Georgia will not have a democracy until the opposition has a voice. |
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