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09.01.08
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Lessons From Iowa
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Comment by Vladimir Frolov
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The Russian political class tuned out over the long New Year’s holidays and largely missed the political earthquake in the United States, where the first event in the 2008 presidential race – the Iowa caucuses – produced seemingly improbable victories for Democratic Senator Barack Obama, an African-American, and a former Arkansas governor, Republican Mike Huckabee, both of whom were running against well-entrenched party machines.
It’s a pity that we in Russia slept through this event, because there are useful lessons from Iowa for the Russian political process.
Lesson one – democratically selecting a presidential candidate in a large country is a long process that cannot be accomplished in just three months.
It has become fashionable for Russian politicians, when faced with Western criticism of the Russian political process, to respond by pointing out that in the U.S. electoral system, presidents are elected not by a direct popular vote but rather through the Electoral College. This is a system that allows a candidate who lost the popular vote win the presidency, as George W. Bush did in 2000, by winning the majority of the electoral votes.
This may well be an outdated procedure that is preserved from the time when communications were provided by horse-drawn carriages. Nevertheless, I can see how an election system that makes a presidential candidate campaign strongly in every region to win its electoral votes, thus winning the election region by region, could do wonders to the unity of the Russian federal state and produce policies that maximize the advantages of Russia’s regional diversity.
But what is really remarkable and important about the modern American presidential election is the long and arduous process known as the primaries through which the parties choose the right candidate.
This system opens the field for a large number of contenders to enter the race and prove their mettle, although it has to be recognized that only the most serious candidates from the point of view of the party establishment and financial donors would be able to fund a full-scale primary campaign in every states.
The primaries start in January of the election year, but the candidates need to prepare for them in advance. This makes the presidential selection process a two-year affair. First, a candidate has to determine if there is enough support within his or her party to raise money and bring on campaign strategists to last your campaign at least through the first caucuses in Iowa and the first primaries in New Hampshire. Then he or she has to develop detailed positions on a wide range of issues, including foreign policy, and formulate campaign messages that would distinguish him or her from the rest of the pack. At the same time, the candidates are required to hire campaign staff in crucial states and build campaign operations like phone banks and volunteer networks along with buying advertising time in competitive media markets in key states and develop campaign material. And then you personally go to the states and personally visit every school, library or a police station.
Through this process, people get to know the candidates very well. Their strengths and vulnerabilities are scrutinized and dissected by the local and national media and their political style is measured in a continuous stream of televised debates with other contenders. And to add insult to injury, almost every week independent polls are released to measure their progress, or lack of it, in the campaign.
It is an ordeal few can withstand. But it serves its purpose – only the best get to be nominated.
If such a system existed in Russia, would Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov and Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky be nominated to run for president for the fourth time after losing every previous election? Would Medvedev be nominated in such a system? And even if he were, would he really want to run?
Russian liberals talked a lot about introducing the primary system to select their presidential candidate, but then nominated Boris Nemtsov, a man with heavy political baggage, only to see him withdraw from the race.
Lesson two – party members, not party bureaucracies select the best candidates.
Barack Obama and Mike Huckabee won in Iowa against the will of their party elders. They and their message resonated with the people.
On the Democratic side, for a long time Hillary Clinton seemed to be a sure bet for the nomination. Her campaign was not particularly inspiring, but highly competent and efficient. She had the best organization, the best donor base, the best media machine and she had her husband, a popular former president, to stump for her. She was the most competent and prepared candidate in the field.
Obama was viewed by the Democratic Party machine as an interesting phenomenon whose time had not yet come. The Democrats might like to nominate the first African-American for president, but not this time around. This was too important an election, the party has a reasonably good shot at the White House and it needs the most experienced and toughest candidate – Clinton. Obama was seen as a distraction.
But Obama, a first term senator from Illinois, positioned himself as a viable agent of change, despite his clear lack of gravitas on many issues. His message of unity and bipartisanship sounded inspirational, while Clinton with her wonkish approach looked dull, promising a restoration of the Clinton presidency rather than change. Democratic voters under 35, who rarely bother to vote, came out in droves for Obama and gave him the victory in Iowa.
On the Republican side, the party establishment backed former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney and Senator John McCain. Huckabee, a former two-term governor of Arkansas, was also seen as a lightweight. After all, apart from being a successful governor of an inconsequential state, his only other qualification for claiming the presidency consisted of having won a personal battle with obesity. The Republican party machine fought against Huckabee and lost. His message of socially conscious conservatism along with the personal warmth he radiated on the campaign trail secured his win in Iowa.
The party machines can affect the outcome in selecting the candidates for president of the United States, but the final say is still with ordinary party members who go to the caucuses or vote in primaries for the candidates they like best. It’s their call.
How much of a say did members of the Russian Communist party have in nominating Zyuganov? Or the members of United Russia, Just Russia, the Agrarian Party and the Civic Force in nominating Medvedev? And, perhaps more importantly, how many of them really wanted to have a say in this process? Or cared enough to say something about it publicly?
Russians say that we want to develop strong parties, but we do not trust their members to select the best candidates that would lead the parties in the most important national election. And perhaps in practical reality we cannot trust the party faithful with selecting the candidates, because they don’t really give a damn who their presidential candidates will be.
We should not copy the American system. It is their country and it works for them. But when we seek to develop something of our own that would be a better fit for Russia, we need to at least try to make it effective. Here the lessons from Iowa deserve a closer look. |
The source |
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