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11.01.08
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Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Georgia’s Vote
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Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
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Contributors: Stephen Blank, James George Jatras, Andrei Liakhov, Sergei Shishkarev
While Russia was recovering from the New Year’s holiday, Georgia went through a snap presidential election and referendum on NATO membership.
The presidential campaign pitted Mikheil Saakashvili, who ousted Eduard Shevardnadze in the 2003 Rose Revolution, against Levan Gachechiladze, a former wine producer representing an opposition bloc that accuses Saakashvili of increasingly authoritarian rule.
Saakashvili called an early election under pressure from the West after imposing a state of emergency in November, when thousands took to the streets of Tbilisi to protest his government and their low living standards. Gachechiladze, who is supported by nine opposition parties, claimed that the president had too much power and pledged to dilute presidential authority through a strengthened, freely elected parliament.
The campaigning was marked by sharp tones and harsh political accusations as well as harassment of opposition candidates by the authorities. A pre-election assessment released on Dec. 27, 2007, by an election observer mission of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) cited an uneven media environment that “indicate[d] a lack of balance in the news coverage of most monitored TV stations, with Saakashvili generally receiving the most coverage.”
Opinion polls gave radically different assessments of the chances of Saakashvili and his six rivals. The Ukrainian think-tank, Common European Cause, predicted that Gachechiladze would collect 30 percent of the vote and Saakashvili 16 percent. In contrast, the Georgian Business Consulting Group, BCG, which carried out a survey of voters on behalf of Saakashvili's campaign headquarters, forecast that the incumbent would be re-elected with 61 percent of the vote. The opposition has disputed the objectivity of this survey.
On election night, an exit poll by Common European Cause gave Gachechiladze an early lead of 31 percent while placing Saakashvili in second place with 24 percent of the vote, signaling the need for a second round of voting.
However, Georgia’s state television called Saakashvili the winner in the first round, with a decisive 52 percent, while Gachechiladze came in a distant second with just 25 percent of the vote. Most analysts continued to predict a second round of voting.
A post election showdown between Saakashvili and the opposition is likely with larger consequences for Gerogia’s relations with both the West and Russia.
Moscow clearly was holding its breath, hoping to see Saakashvili lose the election. The West was not particularly rooting for Saakashvili either.
The U.S.-based organization Freedom House, in its last report before the presidential elections, claimed: “freedom in Georgia takes a step backward in 2007, while Georgia’s democratic ambitions hang in the balance in 2008. Mikheil Saakashvili has dominated the political landscape and shown an unwillingness to engage political opposition and civil society.”
Georgia’s rating in Freedom in the World, Freedom House’s annual global survey, dropped from a three for both political rights and civil liberties in 2006, to a four for both indicators in 2007. A score of one represents the strongest level of performance, while a score of seven is weakest. The country remains in the “Partly Free” category in the global assessment.
So where is Georgia heading? Will Saakshivili’s claim of a first-round victory stand? Or will the opposition force the president into a runoff? How will Russia and the West play the political turmoil in Georgia and a likely stand-off over the disputed election result? Will there be another revolution in Georgia? How will events in Georgia affect the breakaway states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Saakashvili has pledged to return to Georgia’s sovereignty “no matter what”? How will NATO view Georgia’s referendum results and how will it affect its membership prospects?
Sergei Shishkarev, Chairman, Russian State Duma Committee on Transportation
Although the United States rushed to congratulate Saakashvili on his dubious reelection, the Bush administration had to recognize massive irregularities and suppression of opposition campaign activities that had occurred in Georgia. The U.S. State Department issued a statement on Jan. 7 urging the Georgian government to "investigate all allegations of irregularities and work with all political forces to address the challenges and shortcomings identified by international monitors."
The European Union was even more cautious in its assessment of Georgia’s election. The EU presidency, currently held by Slovenia, released a statement on Jan. 8 that underscored the need for Georgia to investigate the procedural violations registered during the voting and to "reinforce the independence of state institutions in a political campaign environment and to strengthen the freedom and pluralism of the media, as well as the independence of the judiciary." In a separate statement, EU External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner similarly noted "important irregularities" during the vote that "need to be addressed," and she too concluded that "a strong and sustained commitment by the Georgian authorities to foster a more pluralistic and participative society is essential."
Representatives of the nine parties aligned in the opposition National Council on Jan. 7 accused the Central Election Commission of manipulating the returns to give Saakashvili the 50 percent-plus-one vote required to avoid a runoff against their candidate Gachechiladze. Three NGOs that monitored the ballot – the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association and New Generation-New Initiative – have lodged between them a total of almost 450 separate protests against procedural violations.
But none of this will have any impact on Saakashvili. He will outmaneuver the fragile and feuding coalition of opposition parties. A reverse replay of the Rose Revolution is not in the cards, since Saakashvili appears to have retained tangible bastions of support throughout the country, while the opposition’s support is limited largely to Tbilisi.
Saakashvili is dangerous precisely because he is likely to try to force the resolution of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia problems, since unsolved border disputes are among the most serious barriers to NATO membership.
It is unlikely that the overwhelming support for NATO membership displayed at Georgia’s referendum will have any impact on the membership decision by NATO itself. The presidential election has proved that Georgia still has a long way to go to become a genuine democracy.
Right after the election, a NATO spokesman said: "NATO will continue to deepen its intensified dialogue with Georgia," thereby apparently ruling out Georgia's hoped-for advancement at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April to a Membership Action Plan, the final stage before a formal invitation is extended to join the alliance.
James George Jatras, Principal, Squire Sanders Public Advocacy, LLC, and Director, American Council for Kosovo, Washington, D.C.
To start with answers to the questions posed: Yes, we now know that Saakashvili has made a dubious claim to a first-round victory. Whether he can pull it off is another matter. The West will play the dispute carefully. The prospects of another Rose Revolution-type mobilization are mixed. According to reports, most of Tbilisi did not support Saakashvili, potentially leaving him vulnerable in the capital. On the other hand, “people power” coups do not succeed without substantial outside support, including cheerleading by the international media, and those ingredients are not – yet – readily identifiable. Even if he pulls through, which he probably will, Saakashvili will be weakened, leaving him less able to try to impose Georgian rule on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In any case, such an attempt would depend on strong support from the U.S., which may not be as enthusiastic about their golden boy Saakashvili as they once were. The same goes for Georgia’s NATO prospects.
We have not yet reached the point where the U.S. regards Saakashvili as a lemon from which all the juice has been squeezed and can be thrown away (Shevardnadze comes to mind), but that point may be approaching. No matter how subservient Saakashvili has been to his masters in Washington, at some point claims of “democracy” fail to pass the laugh test, and the local reincarnation of Thomas Jefferson becomes more of a liability than an asset – hence the surprisingly nuanced attitude now demonstrated toward Saakashvili by his previous benefactors, including not only western governments, but even such reliable barometers as the Washington Post editorial page.
The election, which was supposed to have assuaged concerns about Saakashvili’s regime, now seems only to have exacerbated them. We can expect to hear more about them as the crisis continues to build and the world media, which until the recent disturbances had almost forgotten that Georgia existed, turn their spotlight on an increasingly unattractive vista. As that happens, additional abuses will rise to the surface, such as the railroaded treason conviction of Justice Party leader Maia Topuria. Her politically motivated “trial” before judges transparently took its cues from the executive branch and has yet to be given the attention it deserves.
With respect to Kosovo as a precedent for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the West, including Washington, is just beginning to wake up to how bad the confrontation with Moscow is likely to be if the U.S. pulls the trigger on illegally recognizing a unilateral declaration of independence. In fact, were they to understand it now, they would not move. The paradox is, as of this writing, the authors of America’s misguided Kosovo policy at the State Department are not likely to realize that until after we move, by which time it will be too late to avert the crisis. We can still hope that Washington will step back from the brink, as serious voices speak out on the issue. For example, in a recent op-ed in the Washington Times, retired Admiral James Lyons, whose views command respect both at the White House and the Pentagon, warned against the folly of recognizing Kosovo because it would kick off what he called an “optional” crisis with Moscow. Former Secretary of State and Ambassador to Belgrade Lawrence Eagleburger has also come out against Kosovo’s independence.
Also, if the European Union is sufficiently deterred from following the U.S. position, either because of fears of a confrontation with Russia or because they do not wish to embark on a Kosovo mission on a completely illegal basis, especially with the certain prospect of violence following a declaration of independence, Washington's policy will stall. At least the issue will be kicked forward into the future.
In any case, even if Washington presses forward with its rush into a train wreck, it will not solve anything with regard to Kosovo’s status. But the prospect of a Kosovo crisis should, among other options (including direct support for Belgrade in the ensuing showdown), refocus Moscow’s agenda on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both with respect to a row with the U.S. over Kosovo and as an additional lever over Georgia, Moscow should consider signaling a positive intention toward the independence of those regions, as well as Transnistria, before Kosovo blows up, not after.
Andrei Liakhov, Associate, Norton Rose Law Firm, London
There are undeniably signs that vote rigging (with the blessing of the West) might have played a major, and possibly decisive, role in Georgia’s elections. Since it is extremely difficult to obtain any information in such a small country, we will never know for sure.
However, the reports and analyses I have seen seem to broadly agree on three main things: There were major irregularities in the election process. There is a genuine and strong opposition to the Saakashvili regime. And a lack of unity in the opposition ranks was a major contributing factor to Saakashvili's victory.
My personal view is that the opposition is very similar to the 2004 Rose opposition or the original Kyrgyz "Tulip" opposition – it is essentially a protest vote against Saakashvili. His move for the early election prevented the opposition from fully exploiting the protest mood by adding a recognized popular leader, such as Ukraine’s Yulia Tymoshenko, and at least a semblance of an economic program.
This is possibly the sole major contributor to the result of the election, particularly given the fact that Saakashvili, unlike Leonid Kuchma in Ukraine or Shevarnadze, managed to retain quite a lot of his original popularity. Given these problems and a divided opposition that did not have much to offer, it is plausible that Saakashvili actually won. I also think that if the election were to progress to the second round, Saakashvili would win anyway.
So where is Georgia heading? Much will depend on whether the opposition can manage to unite around one popular leader in something like a “Ukraine without Kuchma” movement
Will Saakshivili’s claim of a first round victory stand? This depends on whether the opposition manages to stage a sustained mass protest. Even if this happens, the second round will definitely happen if Saakashvili uses force. If he does this, the Americans will withdraw their support and the outcome of the political process will become completely unpredictable.
It is highly unlikely that the opposition will force the president into a runoff. It seems instead that Georgia is entering into a prolonged period of "troubles," like post-2001 Ukraine but with more violence.
Georgia is not on top of the political agenda in the United States or Russia, and at least in the medium-term (say, until mid-summer), Georgia will not be the cause of increased tensions between the U.S. and Russia – unless Saakashvili does something that the Russians could be consider a direct challenge to security of its Caucasus border.
In the breakaway states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, recent events will only show that their present political course is correct. Russia has stated on more than one occasion that its power of persuasion is not limitless and it will not be capable of preventing both of these territories from declaring independence if Kosovo does the same. Russia has a very limited influence in these territories and the last thing it wants is another "hot conflict" in the Caucasus.
Georgia’s NATO referendum results will have no impact on Georgia's NATO membership prospects. Under NATO's membership rules, a country cannot be granted membership until it resolves all border disputes. This is what drives Saakashvili's resolve to restore full control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He cannot afford to lose these regions since this might well be the signal for the country's complete disintegration.
Stephen Blank, the US Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA
It might be impossible to answer all these questions within the space allotted to us, but some things are quite clear. Despite charges to the contrary, the election was about as clean and fair as could be expected. Some analysts say that Saakashvili's new term may show a more chastened president given his loss in Tbilisi, but it is unlikely that he will cease trying to transform the status quo in Georgia.
Neither will Russia refrain from the endless provocations it has made as well. Indeed, numerous statements from Russian policymakers and analysts make it clear that they do not believe Georgia really is a sovereign state and that therefore Russian provocations against it are justified even if they add to their suspicions that Tbilisi is intent on a war.
NATO is likely to maintain its watchful and cautious posture towards Georgian membership and wait for tangible signs of military reform and democratization before making any kind of decisive move, such as including Georgia in the membership action plan.
However, it is unlikely that there will be any fundamental change in Russian-Georgian relations. The issue is twofold, involving both Russia's efforts to amputate Georgia's territorial integrity and its constitutional inability to accept the full sovereignty of Georgia or, for that matter, any other CIS country (numerous statements and signs of this attitude abound). These issues transcend any individual personality. Both Georgia and Russia would benefit if the specific issues in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were negotiated rather than remaining subjects of confrontation that undermine the security of both countries.
This means that both Russian President Vladimir Putin and his likely successor Dmitry Medvedev on the one hand and Saakashvili on the other would have to modify their policies more or less simultaneously. And sadly this is quite unlikely.
Dr. Blank’s views as contributed to Russia Profile do not represent the position of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the U.S. Government. |
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