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20.02.08
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Why Can’t We Be Friends
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By Vladimir Frolov
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The presidential transitions of 2008 will present serious challenges to the U.S.-Russia relationship, first in Russia and then in the United States.
New presidents in Moscow and Washington, along with their foreign policy teams, are certain to take stock of what has been accomplished under Putin and Bush, and to reassess specific policies, strategic approaches and the overall direction and tone of the relationship.
Assessing which U.S. presidential candidate would be better or worse for Russia is already the favorite pastime of political pundits in Moscow. Some argue that Democrat Barack Obama would be a better fit for the likely Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, while Republican John McCain, notorious for harsh criticism of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, is considered a worst-case scenario. Others claim that historic records prove that Moscow had an easier time dealing with Republican presidents than with Democrat ones.
The way political transitions in both countries are going to affect the bilateral relationship merits more careful examination. Moscow’s perspective could differ markedly from that of Washington.
We in Moscow do not loose much sleep over the coming political transition in Russia. We all know that there will be little change in policy and that Vladimir Putin could still be calling the most important shots, no matter where he will find his “place in the ranks.” As of right now this appears to be the Prime Minister post.
From this perspective, Russia provides a stabilizing base for the relationship. Secretaries Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates had that sense in Moscow last October, when the Russian side showed no sign of doubt that some of the decisions taken at the meeting would be implemented after the Russian presidential election next March.
Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s leading presidential candidate, staked out a foreign policy stance last week that contrasts noticeably with Putin’s increasingly anti-Western rhetoric. On relations with the United States, Medvedev emphasized cooperation rather than the differences over Kosovo and the U.S. missile defense in Europe. "It is necessary that the United States and Russian Federation cooperate ... It is inevitable," he told a group of regional journalists.
To maximize Russia’s advantages from the global economy, Medvedev appeared open to cooperation with the outside world, suggesting that Russia and the West share common values that make cooperation inevitable. "If before we could ... build walls to insulate ourselves, in today's globalized world, when our states share, in effect, a common set of values, such cooperation should continue."
Whether Medvedev will change the tone of Russian foreign policy rhetoric remains to be seen, but his latest statements signal that he might not be susceptible to “the new Russian arrogance” that has recently permeated Moscow’s foreign policy mentality and public debate. He appears to be aware of the costs that overly assertive international behavior might exert on Russia’s economic development, and wants to conduct his foreign policy without some of the pathos that flourished under Putin.
The U.S. political transition might present more grounds for concern. Often heard from U.S. presidential candidates is criticism of Moscow on democracy, including calls to exclude Russia from the G8 or to develop a modern version of a containment policy. Some claim Putin has no soul to peer into (Hillary Clinton); others say their decision to go to war with Russia would depend on how Russia behaves (John McCain). None of these are particularly encouraging, much less helpful.
A more serious problem might arise if the new U.S. administration decides to bypass Russia on important international issues, and seeks to channel the decision-making process away from the UN Security Council towards a more informal coalition of democratic states, or a “Concert of Democracies.”
This idea was first promoted by two Democrats, Ivo Daalder and James Lindsey, who served in Bill Clinton’s White House. But lately, it has gained increasing popularity with the likely Republican nominee Senator John McCain.
The proposal is simple and unpretentious. Since consensus backing policies promoted by the United States in the UN Security Council is often hard to reach, and since some of the UNSC members, like Russia and China, are not “real democracies,” it might be easier and more productive to transfer the international issue decision-making locus to an informal group of democratic states – a Concert of Democracies - that ostensibly view all international problems from a similar perspective and thus agree to act in a concerted way. Non-democracies, like Russia or China, would be excluded, and would not be in a position to block the U.S. favored action or affect the outcomes of these decisions.
In some sense, such a “Concert” could already have been born this week, after the United States and a group of EU member-states recognized Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence over strong Russian objections and without UNSC approval. This could be one of a series of international decisions by major Western nations that bypassed Russia completely – a precedent Russia is loath to tolerate. Russia’s reaction might in some way either delay or expedite the creation of the Concert of Democracies.
At this point a Concert of Democracies it is still a catchy proposal with an uncertain future. However, it is certainly something that might derail the relationship with Russia if pursued seriously by Washington.
McCain, Obama and Hillary Clinton also share a commitment to and an interest in a democracy promotion agenda that each of them will interpret and pursue differently. Despite the Iraq debacle, democracy promotion is not dead in Washington and all the leading presidential candidates are likely to apply their vision of this agenda to Russia. This will be a serious source of friction in the relationship for many years to come, since Russia is likely to resist democracy promotion policies to be applied to itself and its neighbors.
Another overarching factor in American foreign policy that would be in play regardless of who occupies the White House is the U.S. obsession with “values.”
We hear a lot that America pursues a values-based foreign policy. Values shape the way Americans think about their interests and are critical for building trust with foreign nations.
But when we try to find evidence of this in the actual conduct of American foreign policy, we see that the set of American values could be a shifting substance to provide a sense of legitimacy to a specific policy.
You get the impression of shifting U.S. values by comparing Vice-President Dick Cheney’s speech in Vilnius in April 2007 with the one he gave two days later in Astana. His notion of democracy seemed to have shifted during the flight and following a careful look at Kazakhstan’s energy reserves.
You get this impression by looking at how the arguments for the war in Iraq were manipulated to justify action that, as it turned out, was unnecessary.
This impression comes from comparing the lectures Russia heard in the 1990s on the need to adopt "universal market practices," and the hell that was raised when Moscow brought up prices for supplying energy to its neighbors to market levels. Russia is now “using energy for political purposes.”
There certainly are cases when U.S. foreign policy decisions were made based on values and at a certain loss to U.S. interests (the operation in Somalia in 1993 comes to mind). But the record is clouded and certainly does not give the United States the right to claim adherence to a purely values based foreign policy.
The U.S. obsession with values constantly and unnecessarily irritates Russia. It undermines trust. But it is not going to disappear. One administration would emphasize it more, another -- less. It is a tool of U.S. foreign policy and will remain available on demand.
The challenge, then, is to try to manage it in such a way that does not allow disagreements on values to disrupt cooperation on interests.
For Russia, it would take a much calmer attitude toward criticism from Washington in regard to democracy. Russia should be much more flexible and nuanced in its responses to such criticism, and avoid the temptation to respond in kind. Instead, Russia should emphasize the historical and national characteristics that are at play in the evolution of Russian democratic values and practices.
The United States, on the governmental level, would still need to continue giving Russia, and in the current circumstances Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, the benefit of the doubt that they would do the right thing and set up a sustainable democratic system in this country. There is frankly no other option. There are successful historical precedents of such democratic transitions in other states – Mexico, South Korea, Chile, Spain, Singapore, Taiwan and others.
What the United States should not do is demonstrate official U.S. support for those elements within the Russian opposition that espouse an extremist agenda having nothing to do with democratic values. This was the case in July 2006, when, two U.S. assistant secretaries of state attended the Other Russia conference on the sidelines of the G8 meeting in St.Petersburg, while Senator John McCain sent a video-taped endorsement. Perhaps, they were not aware of the presence of National Bolsheviks and their leader Eduard Limonov, who has been openly flirting with fascist policies.
The transition challenges are there. Whether there is enough skill and patience on both sides to meet them is somewhat less obvious. |
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