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22.02.08
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Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: The Dream President?
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Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
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Contributors: Stephen Blank, Ethan Burger, Eric Kraus, Alexander Rahr
Last Friday, Russia’s likely next President Dmitry Medvedev unveiled his presidential economic and political program for the next four years. The program appears to be very liberal, at least on paper, which prompted some left-wing politicians to talk about a possible “new thaw” and a “new opening” for liberal reforms.
Proclaiming that “freedom is always better than non-freedom,” Medvedev emphasized that the country’s future should be built around respect for personal liberties, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, a reasonably limited role of the state in the economy and cooperation with the outside world, including the United States, to maximize the advantages of globalization.
Medvedev said that freedom – both economic and personal – would be a cornerstone of his economic policy for the next four years as president, which would also focus on the four “I” – institutions, infrastructure, innovation and investment. "We're talking about freedom in all its forms -- personal freedom, economic freedom, and in the end, the freedom of self expression. One of the key elements in our work in the next four years will be ensuring independence of the legal system from the executive and legislative branches of power.”
“Respect for private property has to be one of the foundations of the government's policies,” Medvedev said. "Today more often than not, the government itself is not taking measures to defend the rights of private property holders.”
In what appeared to be a departure from Putin’s overcentralized approach, Medvedev called for a diminished role of state officials in running state corporations. "I think there is no reason for the majority of state officials to sit on the boards of those firms. They should be replaced by truly independent directors, which the state would hire to implement its plans."
Medvedev’s tax policy seems like something that even Grover Nordquist would endorse: “Our tax system must be competitive with the tax systems of other countries. The state should collect as much tax as needed to ensure that society functions effectively and our national businesses do not flee abroad, and the economy doesn't fail.”
And even on foreign policy Medvedev staked out a position that noticeably contrasts with Putin’s increasingly anti-Western stance. On relations with the United States, Medvedev emphasized cooperation rather than the two countries' differences over issues such as Kosovo and the U.S. missile defense shield. “It is necessary that the United States and Russian Federation cooperate ... It is inevitable,” he told a group of regional journalists.
Appearing open to working with the outside world to maximize Russia’s advantages from global economics, Medvedev suggested that Russia and the West share common values that make cooperation ineluctable. “If before we could ... build walls to insulate ourselves, in today's globalized world, when our states share, in effect, a common set of values, such cooperation should continue.”
These rather liberal statements spurred hopes in Moscow that Medvedev’s presidency would create new opportunities for sweeping liberal reforms, and would diminish the role of Putin’s siloviki in running the country. Some liberals, such as Anatoly Chubais and Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Kudrin, have even hinted that the Kremlin’s hard-line foreign policy is starting to hinder Russia’s economic development. Putin, however, insisted on continuing with the policies he had introduced by hinting that he would remain Russia’s prime minister as long as needed to complete his agenda.
Is Dmitry Medvedev Russia’s dream liberal president? Is he a true liberal as his platform suggests, or is it just an election ploy to win over key constituencies? Will he be able to alter the direction set by Putin towards a more pluralistic and law-based society with a truly independent judiciary and media? Will he be able to reign in Putin’s siloviki and limit their influence on the decision-making process? How will Medvedev change Russia’s foreign and security policy, particularly while Putin remains responsible for implementing them as the new prime minister?
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Alexander Rahr, Director of the Russian Program, German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin, and Professor of History, MGIMO University, Moscow:
Dmitry Medvedev`s plea for reform, democracy and a more liberal economic policy comes as a big surprise. Moreover, the siloviki must view his speech as a provocation. Medvedev has bluntly stated that the top people from the present Kremlin administration will not keep their high-level jobs in state corporations. He hinted even that the holdings -- the pride of the siloviki -- could be abandoned soon. The most intriguing question is not whether Medvedev`s speech was a simple PR gag to secure more Western-oriented voters. The real question is why he was allowed to threaten the foundation of Putin’s system two months before the former would step into power.
Rumor has it that Anatoly Chubais and Aleksander Voloshin have become Medvedev`s advisors and campaign managers. This could have happened only with Putin’s full approval. But Putin himself does not express liberal ideas. The situation is puzzling. What is going on in the heart Russian politics? Whatever Medvedev says could and will be interpreted as criticism of Putin’s “managed democracy,” and harsher criticism could follow. The Kremlin’s politologists, who, over the past eight years, acted as ideologists of “sovereign democracy” and persuaded Russians and the outside world that the country is moving in a more self-isolationist, authoritarian direction, nowadays desperately struggle to prove that Medvedev remains conservative and that liberal ideas will not return. Listening to Medvedev one doubts whether the former ideologues of the Putin system really understand the kind of game that is being played.
Medvedev’s statements laid ground for a war with the siloviki. Without the chairmanships in the holdings they have no power and no money. Some sources in Moscow point out that Medvedev is not meeting with bigger crowds of people. His gatherings take place in smaller groups. His bodyguards have been changed; he is now being guarded by a special Kremlin force that also guards Putin.
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Eric Kraus, Managing Director, Nikitski Growth Fund:
Medvedev is undoubtedly sincere. However, his remarks suggest that he shares the classical delusion of the Russian liberals, the belief that Russia can somehow leapfrog the centralizing, “authoritarian” stage of development, landing suddenly amidst advanced liberal democracies. This was once attempted in 1991, and the results could most charitably be described as catastrophic. His boss does not share these illusions.
From the standpoint of global politics, Medvedev may have missed the essential point that the United States and other Western nations are well past their peak: Europe is a museum; America is morally (and increasingly economically) bankrupt. They are sunset powers. Russia’s place is not in the G8, but among the new rising powers – those countries rejecting the old and self-serving politico-economic unipolar model of the second half of the 20th century.
Under the Yeltsin regime, the illusion of Western-style freedoms was little more than a fig leaf for the outright theft of the state. The press was owned by a small, oligarchic clique; the nation’s mineral wealth was stolen; foreign policy was supine, based upon a childlike faith in the goodness of the West, while Russia was increasingly surrounded and plundered. By the end of the 1990s, the nation was desperately impoverished and indeed, in 1998, was briefly threatened with becoming a failed state.
While the process of restoring the Russian State was not always pretty, it has been unarguably successful. The oligarchs have been dismantled as a political class; the murderous Khodorkovsky imprisoned, the corrupt and rapacious regional governors brought to heal, central authority and basic functions of the state restored. Numerous NGOs that were little more than fronts for the political interests of Washington and London have been excluded. Oligarchic control of the media has been replaced with state control, beholden not to foreign powers but to the Kremlin (though, in fairness, we have never seen anything in the Western press on a par with the outright slander and disinformation recently seen on the BBC).
The threat of anarchy has been thwarted, but the system is obviously sub-optimal. Thus, gradual liberalization is now vitally necessary in order for the benefits to reach its citizenry. Medvedev will clearly be a domestic-policy president. Putin is well aware of the negative experience that Russians have with their own state and the incompetence of local governance. After 8 years of economic orthodoxy and relative austerity, the economy is firing on all cylinders, and Russian finances are now among the world’s strongest, unlike Russian society. From the Soviet Union Russia inherited a bureaucracy that is a constant source of frustration, the state is unresponsive to the needs of the citizens, justice is arbitrary, the police -- rapacious, public health is poor and corruption remains a major problem.
President Putin is essentially a conservative – by his own admission, he doubts whether he would have been able to effect the revolutionary changes brought about by Yeltsin in 1991. Similarly, he is not the man to manage the day-to-day reforms of domestic policy – for this very challenging task he has chosen Dmitry Medvedev. Medvedev will serve on the sufferance of the Duma controlled by Putin. Russian economic and foreign policy will remain Putin’s provenance. In his first address to the nation, the new president promised to double Russia’s GDP in ten years; after eight, he is nearly there. Medvedev will now be faced with fulfilling Putin’s new and even more challenging promise - making Russia into one of the world’s most livable countries. Even half-succeeding would be most welcome.
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Professor Stephen Blank, the U.S. Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA:
It would be wonderful if Medvedev was able to reach and fulfill the agenda laid out above. But we should not be taken by intentions, however noble, when reality obstructs their realization. Firstly, many Russian rulers have previously talked liberalization, only to fail or retreat when the reality of their promises and the reaction to it sank in. Medvedev may turn out to be just one in a long line of such reformers.
Secondly, as long as Putin is there it is doubtful that this program can get off the ground, as it differs markedly from his. Moreover, Putin arranged this succession with himself as prime minister because, among other things, he obviously does not trust Medvedev to take over the siloviki and other obstacles without his assistance and authority. Putin’s policies have so far extended the authoritarian nature of the state, which will be extremely difficult to alter, and there will be many objections to change not only on behalf of the siloviki. After all, many powerful bureaucrats have gotten immensely rich and powerful by working this system, and they stand to lose a great deal.
Another problem relates to foreign policy. Can Medvedev take over the military, the foreign intelligence service, the FSB and foreign ministries all of whom are wedded to an anti-Western and Anti-American posture based on what the German philosopher Carl Schmitt called the presupposition of enemies? It doesn't matter that their policies lead to a cul de sac, because popular support for even an illusory great power posture is tremendous, especially if the media is controlled. This is something Medvedev is yet to adapt to.
To succeed, liberalism at home must be accompanied by support for liberal measures abroad, i.e. cooperation with the great democracies. We are yet to see this from Putin and Co. For this reason I would advise caution. We should welcome liberating initiatives in Russia, but we cannot count on them before they materialize.
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Ethan S. Burger, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center and Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service, American University, Washington, D.C. :
I hope (perhaps naively) that President Dmitry Medvedev will see the value of not adopting Soviet-era like postures. Without a doubt national interests, as well as the objectives of various domestic interest groups, determine all countries’ foreign policy objectives (which can often be misguided).
The Moscow Times reported on Feb. 21 that Russia has denied the head of the Human Rights Watch a visa. There are at least 39 similar news reports on the Internet. Apparently, the visa was denied since Human Rights Watch prepared a critical Report of the Kremlin's policies towards non-governmental organizations.
I often do not agree with this organization, in part because it tends to focus on individual as opposed to group rights. Still, along with Human Rights First (formerly known as Lawyers Committee for Human Rights), which incidentally is very critical of certain Bush administration's policies as being in violation of U.S. and international law in areas of civil liberties, due process, and torture, I think that the quality of Human Rights Watch reporting is very high.
Would it not be fair for the Russian government to issue a statement contradicting any alleged flaws in the facts or reasoning of the Human Rights report?
If president Medvedev is indeed a dream president, he will pursue dialogue with domestic opponents and other countries, as well as ensure that rule of law is not selectively applied for political reasons. This is important since Medvedev will have a new counterpart in the U.S. White House next year. |
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