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29.02.08
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Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Russia’s Stake In Kosovo
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Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
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Contributors: Stephen Blank, Ethan Burger, James Jatras, Eugene Kolesnikov, Eric Kraus, Andrew Liakhov, Alexander Rahr, Anthony Salvia, Ira Straus, Vlad Sobell
Following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence on Feb. 17 and its recognition by major Western powers the following week, much has been said about the possible adverse effects this will have on similar unresolved ethnic conflicts in Europe and other parts of the world.
In fact, even some European nations, including Spain, have stopped short of recognizing Kosovo’s independence for fear of inciting similar irredentist claims from the ethnic minorities within their own borders. Countries like Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan strongly condemned the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state.
But for Russia, Kosovo’s proclamation raises even more serious questions about the former’s international influence outside the established framework of legitimate international institutions like the United Nations Security Council, where Russia wields its veto power.
Russia has been unable to prevent Kosovo from gaining independence, although it managed to delay it as much as possible. In fact, Russia did not object to Kosovo being independent per se.
Rather, it was pushing for a solution where Serbia and Kosovo would work out an agreement on Kosovo’s secession with Serbia’s consent and with a blessing from the UNSC.
This was the option Moscow was pushing for. Such a solution would have allowed Russia to claim that final settlement has been achieved within the legal framework of international law and with official approval of the Security Council, i.e. with Russia having a very important say in the matter. And indeed, Martti Ahtisaari’s UN mission and his final report to the UN Secretary
General provided legal grounds for such an outcome. But Serbia rejected Kosovo’s independence completely, and Moscow decided it had no choice but to support Serbia.
The end result is a decision that leaves Moscow and many other states stupefied, contemplating a fait accompli in which their opinion was completely ignored by a group of very powerful nations.
In a sense, the Western decision, albeit far from unanimous, to recognize Kosovo’s independence, was the first act of what could later become “a Concert of Democracies” – a club of democratic nations from which Russia and China would be excluded. These nations would act to bypass the UNSC on major international issues, in the case that consensus at the UN is unachievable due to ideological differences.
This kind of situation puts Russia in a bind. Moscow would be loathe to see itself bypassed on major international issues and would certainly object to such ad hoc decision making outside the UN framework. At the same time, as with Kosovo, there is little the Kremlin can do to stop major Western powers from acting according to their interests.
What does the Kosovo case mean for the international system and Russia’s role in it? Did Russia’s tough stance on Kosovo strengthen or weaken Russia’ international role? Would the decision to bypass the UNSC and Russia on Kosovo be a unique case, or would it serve as a useful precedent by Western powers to bypass Russia in the future? If so, what would it mean for the existing framework of international institutions, particularly the UN? What should Russia do in the foreseeable future to prevent the transformation of the international decision making process into an informal system in which Russia would have no veto power and perhaps little, if any, say at all?
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Alexander Rahr, Director of the Russia Program, German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin, and Associate Professor of History, MGIMO University, Moscow:
The Kosovo case indeed illustrates the formation of a "Concert of Democratic Nations." Had Russia not opposed, but supported, Kosovo`s independence, it would have made no difference in regard to Russia’s authority in the world. Russia has, in the eyes of the West, lost the Cold War and cannot claim back the former status of the Soviet Union.
Sooner or later, the permanent membership of the UN Security Council will be enlarged to include countries such as Germany, Japan, Brazil and India, further isolating Russia in that organization.
Russia’s insistence on following the principles of a Westphalia world order annoys the West, because it is regarded as old-fashioned. In the future, the Transatlantic Community will intervene even more bluntly in state affairs around the world to prevent humanitarian catastrophes, even using NATO as an instrument. Russia can choose to join the Western nations in creating the new "humanistic world" or to stay out of global politics.
By defending Serbia in the Kosovo case, Russia maneuvered itself into a corner. Firstly, Moscow’s opposition to Kosovo’s independence proved to be toothless. Russia can, but will not, recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia in return. Secondly, Russia will not win Serbia over as a new ally in the Balkans. Serbs soon will recognize that Kosovo is lost forever. At which point, they are more likely to start the process of integration into the EU, which would give them economic benefits.
Despite Russia’s impressive economic growth and energy muscle, the West will never offer it anything else as it did with Boris Yeltsin’s Russia in the 90s: full-fledged cooperation in global affairs designed by the "Concert of Democratic Nations."
Russia could choose a policy of self-isolation, an alliance with China (although Beijing would never agree to it), or start the psychologically uneasy process of rapprochement with the EU and the United States on democratic principles. If Russia chooses the latter option, it would need to change its society’s mentality, which glorifies President Putin for promoting Russian self-interests on the global scale.
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Vlad Sobell, Senior Analyst, Daiwa Institute of Research, London:
Vladimir Frolov’s remark that the decision to recognize Kosovo was the “first act of what could later become ‘a Concert of Democracies,’” from which the likes of Russia and China would be excluded, is not quite correct. There are other recent precedents, the bombing of Serbia by NATO in 1999 and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Nevertheless, he asks pertinent questions that reach right to the inner workings of the evolving post-Cold War international system. Is it good or bad that these liberating, “pro-democracy” actions materialize outside the “outdated” UN-based international law? And are Russia and China justified in opposing them and standing up for the “old order”?
There can be no clear answer, as each case must ultimately be judged on its own merit. Furthermore, it will never be possible to fully assess the multiple, long-term consequences of these actions.
While I find it difficult to criticize the 1999 NATO campaign to stop the medieval brutality of the Slobodan Milosevic regime in Kosovo, I am convinced that the granting of independence to the province by a split EU and NATO despite Belgrade’s opposition was a serious error. The West will pay a high price for this in the years to come.
Not only has it dealt a blow to the international order, creating a precedent to be celebrated by separatists around the globe, but it has also undermined the values of democracy, that is, the very things the West claims to be upholding. Today’s Serbia is a profoundly different entity from that of the 1990s, having freed itself from the backward-looking Milosevic regime and voluntarily embarked on a European, pro-Western path. But it has, nevertheless, been “punished” for the sins of the bygone regime. Democrats around the globe are bound to learn a lesson. Democrat or not, when necessary, your interests will be overridden by the interests of Washington.
The extent of the folly becomes clearer when we consider that there was a much better, readily available solution to the “Kosovo problem.” Both Serbia – including a strongly autonomous Kosovo within it – and Albania could have been offered a fast-track accession to EU membership, together with the requisite economic integration and aid.
Certainly this would have been costly and would have created a precedent of dispensing some of the standard conditions for entry. But this would have been a strongly positive, stabilizing precedent, vastly superior to the destabilizing one we now have.
It’s undeniable that while supposedly acting in the name of democracy and stability, the U.S.-led West is actually doing the opposite. Based on the model of post-Saddam Iraq, Europe has become a chessboard on which Washington plays its global power games against Russia and China.
Kosovo had to go independent not because of “democracy,” but above all because it is an exceedingly useful hinterland for the huge U.S. military base located there (Camp Bondsteel would be politically insecure were it indefinitely located on the territory of a Russia-friendly Serbia). Like the Czech Republic and Poland, such assets are needed, given the unreliability of Washington’s long-standing NATO allies, such as Greece, Turkey or Old Europe. Ukraine and Georgia will be the next countries up for grabs in this game. Who cares that the populations of these countries, opposed to the US plans, have not been consulted?
Vladimir Frolov asks whether Russia and China can do anything about it. The answer is unfortunately “not very much.” But I would argue that they actually do not need to do much. As in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States and its satellites will ultimately reap a nasty whirlwind from their short-sighted and irresponsible actions in Europe.
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Eric Kraus, Managing Director, Nikitsky Growth Fund:
A serious blow to Russian pride, the Kosovo debacle is a self-inflicted injury resulting from the Yeltsin government’s supine acquiescence to NATO’s extension of its dictat to the Balkans. Having allowed the Serbs to be bombed into submission with no support for their Slavic ally, Russia was compelled to passively watch the end game without the means to influence its outcome.
The self-serving reassurances by Western powers that Kosovo does not create a precedent are, in fact, true, though not for the reasons given. No precedent has been created for the simple reason that international relations continue to be based upon force, not upon international law. If there was a law-based system, it would clearly have been up to the United Nations to find a negotiated solution, imposing its own if no common solution could be found.
Unlike in the Yeltsin years, Putin’s Russia is certainly not threatened. Although it is very doubtful that the majority of the inhabitants of Chechnya, if polled, would vote for the bandit regime which ruled Chechnya between 1996 and 1999 with such devastating results, this is entirely beside the point – their views will not be solicited. Neither Russia nor any other unitary state will allow secession of one of its provinces except by military force. The Chechen resistance does not have such force at hand.
This is nothing new. The United States fought a long Civil war to prevent the secession of its 13 southern states – they were retained in the Union against the wishes of the vast majority, not by legal rulings, but by the force of arms. Similarly, neither Spain’s control over its Basque provinces, nor France’s hold on Corsica are threatened. Certainly, if there was an international system of justice, China’s occupation of Tibet would be condemned. Since any country which tried to bomb Beijing out of Tibet would promptly find its own territory vitrified by a rain of Chinese missiles, the Tibetans need not dream of their own independence.
None of this is to suggest that Russia need passively acquiesce to being treated as a second-rate power. Instead, the Kremlin must realize that Russia’s status as a member of the Security Council is essentially irrelevant, recognizing the lawless international environment for what it is. Countries are treated as major players not based upon legal niceties, but because of their robust defense of their own vital interests. Moscow must defend Russian interests as the West defends its own, making it clear that never again will it allow its allies to be bombed by NATO, a military alliance with no legal standing to resolve conflicts in non-member states.
In the meantime, Russia must tighten its policy coordination with China, building an alliance able to counterbalance NATO, in particular in Central Asia. Having treated Russia with contempt over Kosovo, the West should expect no cooperation on other dossiers – in particular Iran. If Russia wishes to regain influence, it must rebuild relations with old allies, in particular Cuba, providing a non-ideological alternative to American economic and military hegemony.
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Eugene Kolesnikov, Private Consultant, The Netherlands:
America and yet another “coalition of the willing” established a new state in Europe outside the framework of the UN Security Council and in defiance of Russia and China. Iraq and now Kosovo clearly demonstrate that the United States and its ad hoc coalitions don’t consider themselves bound by the UNSC. The fundamental post-World War II international order that has been manifested in the UNSC arbitrage has been dismantled. It is important to understand that this change is not a paroxysm of President George Bush's neo-con administration policies but a major change in the U.S. geopolitical vision.
This change means that Russia and China are denied formal UNSC arbitrage powers and have to pursue their interests vis-?-vis the United States on a case by case basis, outside the UNSC framework. Certainly, UNSC will continue to exist, but it will work only when Washington wants it to work. This change also means that all other countries are given a powerful message that world security arbitrage now predominantly resides with the United States.
Since China is presently focused on its internal development, and the United States hopes to incorporate it into the inchoate, new-world governance framework, Russia, for the time being, is left isolated and squarely facing a dilemma to either bow to the United States or to pick up a fight. Apparently, the West is expecting Russia to bow or limit its wrath to rhetoric or minor political gestures. One of the gestures that Washington could probably accept is a long discussed partitioning of Kosovo whereby the northern Serbian enclaves de facto join Serbia, with Russia supporting such a move politically or even with a peacekeeping contingent should Serbia so desire.
Quite a number of analysts suggested that Russia may start playing it difficult with the United States over cooperation on nuclear proliferation and anti-terrorism. I very much doubt this. Russia's feet dragging on these issues would not persuade Washington to change its mind nor will it improve Russian standing vis-?-vis the United States and the larger international community.
The question is therefore whether Russia will take major retaliatory actions to put itself on par with the United States. I think we will know soon, probably after the April NATO summit. The following escalation sequence is possible: stirring independence movements in pro-Russian parts of Ukraine and escalation of tensions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, if Ukraine and Georgia are given a green light for moving toward NATO membership at the April NATO summit, followed by recognition of the independence of Transdniestr and eventually Abkhazia and South Ossetia, if the West does not alter its Russia policy.
Russia has reached a very critical decision point that may change the future dynamics of the Russia-West relationship and even world politics in quite a radical way. In my opinion, Russia will have to face the United States now, as nothing is going to change substantively in the next decade, and there is nowhere to retreat. Any other decision would mean the triumph of the American world order. I doubt that the Russian leadership can live with this triumph.
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James George Jatras, Principal, Squire Sanders Public Advocacy, LLC, and Director, American Council for Kosovo:
It would be unfortunate if anyone came to the conclusion that Kosovo's independence is in any way a fait accompli. Indeed, the opposite is the case. Kosovo will be the Biafra of the first decade of the 21st century.
The miscalculation by the United States that through an act of machtpolitik it could redraw borders has not turned out to be the expected cakewalk. Just over a dozen countries have been foolish enough to recognize Kosovo, an illegal, criminal-ruled, economically nonviable entity.
To be sure, three nuclear-armed permanent members of the Security Council have done so. But Russia, China, and India (two permanent members and a country that should be) have not recognized it and almost certainly will not. Washington's facile claim that 100 countries were lining up to extend recognition was a soap bubble. Some observers think the real number may hardly break 20. Non-recognizing countries already constitute more than half the world's population, and with the likely support of Indonesia, Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria, perhaps Israel, and most of Africa and Latin America, may exceed three-fourths. Maybe Washington is counting on mighty Tonga and Lesotho.
Rather than thinking that Russia is faced with a humiliating defeat and devaluation of its standing in the international system – one of Washington's conscious motivations in trying to force its preferred "final solution" on Serbia – Russia stands on the verge of a decisive victory.
Indeed, it is a victory Moscow must take, if Washington is to be thwarted in a policy intended to degrade Russia no less than Serbia. Instead, the developing stillbirth of “Kosova” and the resulting frozen conflict is shaping up to be the final and perhaps most ridiculous foreign policy failure of the Bush Administration.
As regrettable as the disorders in Belgrade were, particularly the embassy attacks, they should be put into context. Despite the complaints of U.S. officials that "sovereign" American territory has been violated, Serbian riot police were deployed within the hour, the violence suppressed, and fault admitted. Some 200 suspects were placed in custody and the dragnet is out for more. No doubt Belgrade will compensate for the damage. In any case, the disturbances probably dissuaded a number of countries the United States was counting on for recognition to stand aloof, so as not to get caught in the unfolding train wreck.
Serbia’s failure to fully protect embassies is a far cry from NATO's malfeasance in protecting Serbs in Kosovo over the past nine years. Belgrade's inadequate enforcement of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations pales next to Washington's calculated breach of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, UNSC Resolution 1244, the North Atlantic Treaty, the U.S. Constitution, the Serbian Constitution, and pretty much every standard of law or decency there is to violate.
Washington has expressed particular outrage over suggestions by Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, that force may be an option if Washington presses forward with its own use of force to draw a border between Kosovo and the rest of Serbia, or to impose on Serbs in Kosovo the will of the illegitimate “authorities” in Pristina and the EU’s paradoxically named “rule of law” mission. Serbia will not submit to either, and NATO has no such mandates under Resolution 1244.
The ensuing frozen conflict over Kosovo should not be seen as a prelude to partition. Instead, it must be seen for what it is: Serbia’s reassertion of effective control over part of Kosovo, and the pending liberation, over an uncertain time frame, of the remainder of its territory, which now is subject to an administration dominated by jihad terrorists, war criminals, and racketeers, all propped up by foreign occupiers. The sooner Washington’s ill-advised triggering of the current crisis is seen for the failure it is, the sooner the ersatz entity will collapse and real negotiations between Belgrade and decent elements of the Kosovo Albanian community, with no predetermined outcome, can begin.
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Professor Andrew G Liakhov, Member of the Law Society of England and Wales and Expert, Arbitration Commission for Peace Conference for Yugoslavia (1992-1994) :
Having been the expert on the Badinter commission, the degree of misinformation on the concept of cession in public international law is simply amazing. It would be wrong to seek to use SC Res. 1244 as the sole instrument to either support or deny Kosovo's independence. To understand the legal implications of the Kosovo assembly’s act, one must look further into how the modern public international law treats secession of states.
Legally, the situation is not as one sided as Russia and Serbia try to portray it. Leaving aside historical, political and emotional spin put on the Kosovo affair, secession, from the international law point of view, is definitely neither unique nor precedent-setting.
States have shown themselves "allergic" to the concept of secession at all times, to the extent that until very recently even the word “secession” was not used in public law documents. "Separation of a part of a State” was used instead. This is because cession is characterized by the lack of consent of the predecessor State. On the one hand, the absence of agreement is a source of dispute between the new and the parent State. On the other hand, for want of consent of the latter, the newly formed entity has to find a legal justification for its creation elsewhere. Kosovo’s situation is not particularly different.
The only real dispute is whether Kosovo's independence is a classic secession or if it was created, like Namibia, Erithrea, East Timor, Micronesia and Palau, on the basis of international law with the latter having played a role of a “midwife,” providing legal justification for the creation of new States.
The role of SC Res.1244 cannot be limited to allowing or disallowing Kosovo's cession. Instead, the question should be whether the Resolution created an international status for Kosovo which included this territory into the international law scope. The Resolution in itself does not create an international status for Kosovo, furthermore it asserts Serbia's sovereignty over the province and allows Serbian police forces to return to Kosovo. The principal task of the international civil administration was to ensure that "the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo."
Thus SC Res. 1244 cannot be used to argue that the independent state of Kosovo was created on the basis of international law. This gives Russia's claim that Kosovo's independence must be achieved on the basis of an agreement with Serbia some credence in international law, although nothing could legally bar the current KLA administration from a one sided proclamation of independence. The wording of SC Res. 1244 in relation to the future of Kosovo is ambiguous enough, and the creation of an independent Kosovo state technically is not a breach of any of the rules of modern international law, irrespective of how wrong morally, politically or otherwise people might think it is.
Kosovo's case is neither the first nor the last in the long "parade of independencies." Legally, Kosovo's independence does not set any new precedents. There is an inherent contradiction in modern international law between the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination which allows major international actors quite a lot of freedom of action when they need it.
Kosovo is deemed to be a relatively minor affair in the grand scheme of things in Washington. Russia is no longer the principal focus of the White House foreign policy. However, Washington needs Russia's cooperation on issues which are much more important to the United States (like Iran or Afghanistan) than Kosovo, which gives Russia quite a lot of leverage in Washington. The United States will continue to bypass the UN when it feels that it does not need its stamp of approval, until the power balance on which the UN mechanism is based is fully restored. Russia should seek such restoration.
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Anthony T. Salvia, Special Adviser to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in the Reagan Administration:
The Kosovo case marks America's emergence as a full-blown revolutionary, revisionist power, even as its ability to afford its hyperactive role in every nook and cranny of the globe is increasingly doubted. In sponsoring the partition of Serbia in contravention of UN Resolution 1244, the United States has completed its transition from Republic to Empire, begun in 1999 in the Parisian suburb of Rambouillet.
From now on, the United States alone will determine the course of events everywhere, even in places with little or no discernable connection to U.S. interests. The UN Charter will be observed when convenient, ignored when not. Washington will decide which aggrieved minorities deserve their own state and which do not (the Albanians, yes, the Palestinians, no).
Russia, meanwhile, has stepped forward as the world's leading conservative power. Moscow's aims are limited, rational and predictable: to preserve the international legal system enshrined in the UN Charter, to influence events in Russia's "near abroad" in ways favorable to Russian interests, and to retain the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent.
But Russia's most pressing task remains domestic -- repairing the damage done by 70 years of Communist misrule, if only others would leave the country in peace to get on with it.
Sadly, Washington is relentless and Russia knows no peace. When Washington isn't campaigning against Orthodox Christian Europe, it's fomenting anti-Russian upheavals in Moscow's backyard, planning to park an ABM system on Russia's doorstep, and enlisting former Soviet republics in a military alliance against Russia.
Russia clearly occupies the moral high ground in this conflict. It's rare that Russia and Russian policy appear bathed in a nimbus of moral nobility, but that's precisely where Russia's principled defense of international law, the rights of small states and the integrity of (what's left of) Christendom have landed it. I believe that opposition to the partition of Serbia constitutes Russia's finest hour since 1991.
As the world's diplomats are not exactly tripping over themselves to take up residence in Pristina (the U.S. State Department must be severely disappointed in the paucity of states recognizing its stillborn creation), Russia and Serbia should stick to their guns in this matter. In doing so, they will be doing the United States a favor, for they will be giving it a chance to reverse its reckless, ill-considered course.
While Washington is at it, it should engage in the agonizing reappraisal of U.S. foreign policy that should have taken place after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but never did.
It should start with the idea that a US-European-Russian entente based on the shared moral, intellectual and spiritual patrimony of Rome, Athens and Jerusalem is the way to go, rather than promoting terror, drug-running, slavery, ethnic cleansing and the destruction of Christian monuments in the heart of Europe.
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Professor Stephen Blank, the US Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA:
Although I think Kosovo's independence is a bad decision, and that Western support for it is misconceived because no matter what the EU says, it reinforces a precedent. Moscow may originally have pushed for a conclusion based on a peaceful mutually negotiated settlement that would accord with international law and UN supremacy, but it reversed its own course because it felt it had no choice but to side with Serbia.
In fact, Serbia was not and is not ever prepared to grant either genuine autonomy or independence to Kosovo, even though it forfeited its claim to effective sovereignty over Kosovo in 1999 as a result of the war with NATO. There is and was no practical way to keep Kosovo under Serbian authority, even though the EU is derelict for not doing enough to ensure that an independent Kosovo gave effective and credible guarantees to its Serb minority.
Russia thus adopted a stance not out of any strict adherence to principle or law, but based on its own concept of self-interest, i.e. that European integration and consolidation should not take place, but the Balkan security situation should remain fluid and unconsummated. It is in the interests of the United States, the UK, France, and Germany that Balkan problems be resolved. As for Russia's statements about the UN, they are nothing more than crocodile tears. If Moscow was truly concerned about the UN being the supreme decision maker for reasons other than the fact that it has a seat on the Security Council, it would long ago have let the UN and the OSCE play the roles they are supposed to play in the frozen conflicts in Moldova and in the Caucasus. Instead, that action has been blocked at all turns.
Vladimir Frolov asserts that Kosovo independence and subsequent recognition thereof was a fait accompli by a “Concert of Democracies” that might bypass the UNSC, Russia and China. But by what right does Russia have to hold a veto over this decision?
Does Kosovo serve as a precedent for bypassing Russia in the future? Perhaps, but Russia' self-serving obstruction of all other avenues of constructive action certainly did not inspire confidence. The whole course of Russian foreign policy under Putin has been the declaration of its sovereign independence to do as it sees fit, not what international law or institutions might do. Indeed, obstruction of those institutions in the name of this sovereign independence has been a consistent policy for a long time.
So there really is no justification for complaining about being isolated, if Russia chooses first to isolate itself and go its own way. If indeed there is a threat that the international system will become one where Russia is isolated with few cards to play, then it not only needs to develop its cards, it also has to integrate with those organizations instead of proclaiming one set of standards for itself and another standard of subordination to a Russian veto where other states' interests are involved.
Ultimately, Russian diplomacy in Kosovo has been obstructive for self-seeking reasons, not out of any principled attachment to the UN. Neither Washington nor Brussels nor Berlin is bound to accept Moscow's claim that it has a veto on their policies, but the reverse is not true. Here Moscow has reaped what it has sown.
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Ethan S. Burger, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, & Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC:
World War I largely broke out because of Russia's backing of Serbia following the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was an avoidable conflict that the European leadership allowed to get out of control, and it led to the death of millions and the demise of the Russian Empire.
It is difficult for me to understand Russia's real interest in opposing the independence of Kosovo. Serbia's newly-elected President Boris Tadic wants his country to become a member of the European Union. I hope this happens. Although he is on the record as opposing Kosovo's secession from Serbia, Kosovo's demographics and current political situation make its remaining a Serbian province impossible.
Both president Tadic and [future] Russian president Medvedev have every right to attempt to ensure that the Serbian and other minorities in Kosovo enjoy equal rights, but in accordance with the principle of self-determination the overwhelming majority of the population of Kosovo want to be independent of Serbia. Serbia's history is not a strong enough basis to justify hostilities or increased tensions in the area. Ideally, Serbia should offer Kosovo economic incentives to lessen any possible negative impact on Serbian citizens or ethnic Serbs in Kosovo.
Perhaps, the Russian leadership’s collective ego is clouding its judgment. Indeed it is possible that some within the Russian leadership fear that separatism anywhere in the world is a harbinger of bad things for Russia in the future. I don't think situations in one region are a precedent for another.
I think the lesson the Russian leadership needs to appreciate is that a healthy economy, a good quality of life for a country's citizens, and respect for human and ethnic/national rights will defeat support for extreme nationalism in cases where the separating state is unlikely to be viable. If at some time in the future, the Kosovars wish to join their state to Albania, I hope this is accomplished in a peaceful way, respectful of the interests of all the countries in the region.
I believe that the EU and the United States must be consistent in their application of international humanitarian law, if legitimate charges of war crimes are brought against Kosovars in the future. War crimes should be judged according to a single international standard irrespective of the perpetrator.
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Ira Straus, U.S. Coordinator, Committee on Russia in NATO, Washington DC:
Vladimir Frolov eloquently states the Russian case, replete with the basic misconceptions that pervade Russian discourse alongside his many sound observations. I will deal here with a couple of the misconceptions.
Number one: "Serbia objected to Kosovo’s independence under any circumstances and Moscow decided it had no choice but to support Serbia."
There exists a parallel assertion: "Kosovo objected to Serb sovereignty under any circumstances and the West decided it had no choice but to support Kosovo."
Both assertions are "true" only in the sense of hiding behind the phrase “decided it had no choice.” In reality, each side made a decision. There were other choices. It was the dominant discourse that excluded them.
Kosovar Albanians decided they wanted Kosovo whole. Serbia matched or exceeded that, deciding in its new constitution that it could not discuss any loss of territory, i.e. any partition of Kosovo. Nevertheless, moderate Serb national-democrats always said a partition of Kosovo was the most reasonable solution.
Russia and the West could have discussed such options. They didn't. Russia refused to consider this option -- the only realistic one for the Serb minority in Kosovo. If Russia, with its closeness to the issue, would not consider it, no one farther away could be expected to.
Number two: "The Western decision ... to recognize Kosovo’s independence was the first act of what could later become “a Concert of Democracies” – a club of democratic nations, from which Russia and China would be excluded… "
The writer is over-dramatic here, and over-optimistic. He gives the West, as seeking to create a coherent world order, far too much credit.
There is no new Concert of Democracies in the Kosovo action. However, there already is a longstanding series of Concerts of Democracies. The West has been the core of the real existing world order ever since Columbus arrived at America; it has been willy-nilly uniting itself ever since the Anglo-American rapprochement of the late 1800s, lending to the world order such coherence as it presently has. The uniting continues, in bits and pieces.
"Concerts of Democracies" exist today in numerous organized and informal structures, from Western clubs like NATO, OECD, G-8 and the EU, to global clubs like the Community of Democracies to the Caucus of Democracies at the UN. There is a long tradition of "unilateral" action by these organizations (and by non-democratic international organizations, too), as well as by individual countries, when the UN doesn't find a consensus to do something.
With the Council of Europe and the OSCE, Russia increasingly objects to the institutions per se because they act too much like a Concert of Democracies on the basis of their lawfully-agreed democratic foundations, sometimes able to ignore Russia's disagreement despite Russia’s membership.
Russia also objects to the UN when it doesn't like the outcome there. It would have been aghast if the case of Kosovo had been taken to the UN General Assembly in 1999; a large majority would have voted to support Western armed intervention.
Russia takes plenty of unilateral actions on its own, with scant regard for legal proprieties when they get in the way. The use of "international law" as a slogan in Russian discourse, pulled out regularly for attacking any action Russia dislikes, is a specimen of polemic replacing reason.
When a normative contradiction arises, it creates a need for honest deliberation on the full range of practical and moral aspects, aimed at sound judgment -- not for polemics based on absolutizing one of the normative claims and excoriating any violation of it. Kosovo in 1999 was a case in point. The West agonized over the contradiction before deciding to act in 1999; Russia didn’t, it simply seized on one end of the contradiction for the sake of making a blind polemic. It has been doing so ever since. It is a practice that further decreases the space for great power dialogue, reduces chances for attention to Russia's valid points (and Russia did have some valid points on Kosovo), adds to the friction, and increases prospects for marginalization of Russia. |
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