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25.09.09
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A Breakthrough On Missile Defense?
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Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
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U.S. President Barack Obama made the inevitable decision last week to cancel George Bush administration’s plans to deploy strategic missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic, which was warmly welcomed by Moscow. But will Obama’s move be enough to truly reload the U.S.-Russian relations? What about Europe – why is Obama’s decision welcomed by “old” Europe and even by NATO’s Secretary General, but regretted and even denounced in “new” Europe? Will Obama’s decision strengthen Medvedev domestically, justifying his personal bet on building up Medvedev as a progressive Russian leader?
Obama attributed his decision to a more realistic assessment of the Iranian ballistic missile threat to Europe (which is not yet there, and will not materialize for at least another decade) and the availability of a more versatile and proven missile defense technology (land and sea-based theater missile defense systems like Aegis missile cruisers and THAAD).
Undoubtedly, these are the prime reasons behind this move, which reflects the skepticism Obama’s military advisors have always displayed toward the previous administration’s plans. Obama made it clear that he still believes missile defense should be part of the answer to deal with the threat of Iranian ballistic missiles (possibly armed with nuclear warheads). He outlined a sweeping plan for missile defense deployments in Europe up until 2020. But the technology he intends to use for this is not threatening to Russia, and in fact could be networked with similar Russian early warning, detection and theater missile defense systems.
This reflects another strategic rationale behind Obama’s decision – to eliminate Russia’s concerns and fears over the missile defense plans that look extremely and unnecessarily provocative to Moscow. Obama’s bet is that this will create a strategic opening in U.S.-Russian relations that will allow engaging Moscow on matters of much greater immediate concern and importance to Washington – like the Iranian nuclear program and combating international terrorism in Afghanistan.
Obama’s decision on missile defense will immediately increase mutual trust between Moscow and Washington and aid the conclusion of the talks on a new strategic nuclear reductions treaty now underway in Vienna. It will also make it possible to launch a practical discussion on joint efforts on theater missile defense in Europe – an idea that has some tangible support among Russia’s elites and even within NATO.
But will Obama’s move be enough to truly reload the U.S.-Russian relations? Will it secure a positive Russian response on matters where the Obama administration wants it to respond, like toughening the UN nuclear sanctions on Iran or cancelling plans to sell sophisticated air-defense systems to Teheran? How should Russia respond to this, apart from Dmitry Medvedev’s very positive statements regarding Obama? What about Europe – why is Obama’s decision welcomed by Old Europe and even by NATO’s Secretary General, but regretted and even denounced in New Europe? Will Obama’s decision strengthen Medvedev domestically, justifying his personal bet on building up Medvedev as a progressive Russian leader? How will Vladimir Putin react to this, apart from his tepid welcome of Obama’s missile defense statement?
Edward Lozansky, President, American University in Moscow, Washington DC:
Last week was marked by two intimately connected major events: Obama announced the scrapping of the plan to deploy missile defense shield elements in Eastern Europe, and NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen made an arguably even more impressive speech listing three global security initiatives aimed at rapprochement with Russia. It would hardly be an overstatement to call the two events historic, for never before have a U.S. president and a NATO secretary general made such promising and friendly moves toward Russia, and not just by word, but actually by deed.
NATO’s readiness for a joint U.S.-Russian missile defense system and a serious consideration of Medvedev’s idea for a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture amounts to acknowledging Russia’s role as a major player on the European continent. This can also be regarded as an invitation to Russia to complete a military and eventually also a political and economic integration with the West.
The content of Obama’s speech came as no surprise due to leaks to the press long before the official announcement was made. As was to be expected, both in America and in other countries, particularly in Poland and the Czech Republic, a massive campaign to condemn this decision was launched even before the speech. Vitriolic outbursts accusing Obama, at best, of weakness, incompetence and enormous concessions to Russia, and at worst of something amounting to the betrayal of the country’s interests, inundated the U.S. media. It has to be said, though, that there were also numerous supporters of Obama’s decision, even among prominent republicans, such as Brent Scowcroft, the former national security adviser under George Bush Sr., the former presidential candidate Pat Buchanan, and many others.
Most of the European allies are backing Obama and along with even the majority of populations in Poland and in the Czech Republic, except their leadership, of course. As in the good old times of the Soviet Union, someone helped to organize protest petitions by East European public figures, intellectuals, etc., imploring the West not to abandon America’s weak, defenseless and loyal friends face to face with aggressive Russia.
All those appeals looked pretty pathetic, because they as good as made nonsense of Bush’s endless harangues about the missile defense in Eastern Europe targeting Iran alone and in no way aimed at Russia. To listen to these “intellectuals,” the system must have been devised precisely for containing Russia; otherwise what’s the point of these jeremiads?
Now all eyes are on Moscow and judging by the statements of the Russian leadership to date, the initial reaction was fairly positive. This is encouraging. However just as the folks in the Kremlin invariably demand deeds rather than words from others, the Russians would do well to act likewise.
There is very real danger of Moscow taking these initiatives as yet another cunning move by Washington and Brussels, with Russia being told to make some tangible geopolitical concessions in exchange for the scrapping of Bush’s costly and, what’s worse, ineffective toy, plus a few meaningless promises from NATO. "Those who are talking about a concession to Russia are primarily those who are looking for a bargaining chip in seeking extra dividends of some kind from us," said Dmitry Rogozin, Russia's envoy to NATO.
Clearly, no one expects any sort of gratitude or charity for Obama, as this is purely a matter of pragmatism. The fact is that Russia, just as America, Europe, China, India – the list could be extended indefinitely – is interested in stability in Afghanistan and not interested in seeing Iran in possession of nuclear weapons.
It so happens that Russia, for various geographical, historical, economic, and other reasons, is the one country capable of making a substantial, and in the case of Iran, perhaps crucial, contribution to the settlement of precisely these problems. It would be wrong to say that currently Russia is not doing anything to this end. Yet it could do much more, and not just to please Washington or Brussels, but primarily for the sake of its own security. If this viewpoint prevailed in the Kremlin, that would be precisely the reciprocal step to meet Obama halfway that might be followed by other positive steps toward each other. Eventually, this might kick-start the irreversible process of integrating of Russia with the West that has been our cherished dream ever since the collapse of communism.
Now all eyes are on Medvedev’s trip to New York. Is he bringing any presents to Obama? He certainly should even if they are only symbolic. We should keep momentum going.
Sergei Roy, Editor, www.psj-journal.ru, Moscow:
President Obama’s decision to scrap plans for a “third position region” of a global ABM defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic has been overwhelmingly welcomed in “old” Europe, Obama-supporting America and, perhaps most enthusiastically, in Russia. Philosophically speaking, it is a pretty depressing comment on the state of our world that a sound, sober, and simply cost-saving move should be seen as something extraordinary, practically unheard-of in international relations.
Negative reactions to this move are also highly indicative and, frankly, worth a smirk. Take this quote: "This is going to be seen as a capitulation to the Russians…” (Sen. Lindsey Graham). Others talk of “concessions” or a “giveaway” to Russia, of “appeasement” of Russia, of “abandoning” Poland to the mercy of an “aggressive” Russia. The more literally-minded might wonder what Russia has to do with all that. Wasn’t the anti-missile defense shield totally and exclusively aimed at Iran, presenting no conceivable threat to Russia? Weren’t Russia’s objections to it ridiculed? Didn’t Condoleezza Rice pooh-pooh the Russians’ ignorance of geographical facts? Well, well. It appears that those Russians were well up on their geography after all and rightly felt uncomfortable about a radar station in a Czech village that could control Russia’s space all the way to the Urals.
If anything, that episode, like so many others in recent history, should teach Russians to view any U.S. move in ABM defense (as in any other “defense” area) with sober caution rather than credulous enthusiasm. My first idea on hearing of Obama opting for sea-based Standard-3 anti-missiles instead of those in Poland was: “hey, which sea?” If it’s the Mediterranean and the North Sea, that’s OK, but what about the Black Sea or, God forbid, the Baltic? Those missiles will be much closer to Russia, while still in international waters or those of Ukraine or Georgia (why not Estonia’s, then?), and who will give a written guarantee that they are strictly anti-missile missiles? What about those early warning radar stations? Will they be based in Israel and Turkey – or in Georgia and/or Ukraine?
Clearly Obama’s latest move has introduced much indeterminacy, and many things will have to be thrashed out yet to truly reset U.S.—Russian relations. Yet talk has immediately started of some “concessions” on Russia’s part in response to American ones. True, in a CBS interview president Obama made his stance absolutely clear: "Russia had always been paranoid about this, but George Bush was right. This wasn't a threat to them." Now, if this whole thing had nothing to do with Russia (as State Secretary Hillary Clinton stressed again in a Brooklyn Institute speech), why expect those paranoid Russians to go all out “to work more effectively with [United States] to deal with threats like ballistic missiles from Iran or nuclear development in Iran”?
Treating Obama’s harsh rhetoric (echoing Bush’s and Rice’s) as a mere attempt to counter the wave of domestic criticism, Russia might agree to do something along the lines suggested by Obama, only the question is, how? Pressuring Iran is easier said than done: Mahmoud “Death-to-America” Ahmadinejad is just not susceptible to pressure. Should Russia renege on its contract to supply Iran with AA systems? Not possible for both economic and political reasons: Iran would rightly regard this as a hostile act, and any leverage with Iran that Russia might have would vanish overnight.
Sure, the temperature in U.S.-Russian relations has risen perceptibly. But temperature, while conducive to successful negotiations, is no substitute for treaties – START I, or the new European security architecture, or the like. In working on these the Russian side should bear in mind that the United States has so far made no concessions to Russia – exactly as president Obama has said.
Ethan S. Burger, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC:
Throughout history, many U.S. presidents took refuge working on foreign policy issues, since it was often easier to make progress in this area than to deal with domestic problems. Although their situations are quite different, both U.S. President Barak Obama and the Russian president find themselves in similar predicaments.
It is no secret that Western political and business leaders believe that Medvedev will promote more benign foreign and domestic policies than Putin. Their demeanors, education, experience, and world views differ.
Despite assertions to the contrary, there are indeed philosophical differences between the two Russian leaders and these result in concrete policy differences. It is a matter of differing approaches, or, as a recent Financial Times editorial called it, pretending to compete, perhaps to create an illusion of pluralism. While one should not exaggerate their differences, Medvedev’s business and legal background better prepares him to deal with the Russians’ foreign and domestic problems today.
President Obama faces a nearly impossible task. First, he has to provide Medvedev with some tangible accomplishment (he has already done so by announcing the cancellation of the Bush administration’s plan to deploy elements of a missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland). Ostensibly, this system was designed to protect against a limited nuclear missile attack from Iran. Logically, Russian missile and air forces could easily overwhelm such a system. Nonetheless, it is hard to envision the development of an Iranian threat to Europe in the near-term. This may explain why the Russian national security community seemed to assume some sinister motivation for such deployments.
The Czech and Polish governments attached great symbolic importance to the location of this system on their territory. It served as another validation of their decision to tie their countries’ future to NATO and the European Union, irrespective of significant domestic opposition. Unfortunately, the Obama administration failed to give the Czech and the Poles much advanced warning of its decision. This unilateralism was amateurish and reminiscent of the Bush the Younger’s presidency. Perhaps the deployment of a small number of British, French, German and U.S. troops in the newest members of NATO would have a positive psychological effect.
President Obama has had to explain why the new defensive plans are better suited to the nature of the Iranian threat to Western (and Israeli) interests. Indeed, it seems logical to design and deploy a missile defense system to protect against an attack emanating from Iran based on existing technology located closer to Iran. Unfortunately, this would seem to mean that president Medvedev did not obtain a concession from the United States.
Ira Straus, U.S. Coordinator, Committee on Russia in NATO, Washington, DC:
The missile defense move needs to be seen together with not only the Obama administration’s talk of a “reset,” but with the quite substantial three stage plan laid out by NATO’s secretary general Rasmussen last week for achieving an enduring NATO-Russia reset.
As is to be expected, "new" Europe is against all three moves. It is a sad fact, since the new NATO members are showing on every occasion that they were not in good faith in two of their important pledges to NATO as a condition for their membership -- that they would support NATO's strategy of seeking cooperation with Russia, and that they would not oppose subsequent NATO membership for any country farther east.
Nevertheless, the Eastern Europeans have a point, indirectly, on the missile defense matter: they had never wanted this, but had accepted it as an indirect way of getting a U.S. military presence on the ground; this provided the reassurance they wanted in wake of the Georgian war and in lieu of the capacity the Russian leadership was displaying of talking itself into aggressive military actions and proceeding to virtual annexations. Now the Baltic States want new assurances, such as bases, joint exercises, and NATO contingency planning, which were in fact the logical response from the start. Russia should take note when Thomas Graham, as true a friend as Russia will ever find among serious (non-self-hating) people in the West, says that such other forms of reassurance on the ground will be needed in place of the missile defense sites. This is the logical consequence of the Georgian war, which erased the condition -- no plausible threat to Eastern Europe -- that was the explicit basis for the previous NATO posture and pledges of avoiding a presence on the ground in Eastern Europe. It will remain the logical approach until such time as Russia can give other convincing reassurance on its own, which probably could be done only after it undoes its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and moves to compromise with Georgia on their future status, and reverses its provocative actions against Ukraine in the Crimea and elsewhere. If Russia is not ready to do this, then it would only be gracious if it were to accept the substitute, the minimum version of which is reassurance of Eastern Europe by NATO defense planning and exercises. Of course, it would be better if Russia would head off the need for this and de-recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, excusing itself on the grounds of a lesser sense of threat from the West.
Reciprocation of the missile defense gesture is another matter. There can be no symmetrical reciprocation in such matters, but there can be asymmetrical ones -- other things, which ought to be done in any case, and will be understood as a kind of reciprocation.
One such relevant asymmetrical reciprocation would be to cancel Russia's missile sale to Iran, which is truly a noxious sale. If this does not change, no one in the West will be able to view Russia as a constructive and trustworthy partner on the Iranian nuclear question (even if people continue to regard Russia as a sometimes necessary partner on it). If it does change, then differences on UN sanction resolutions could be accepted.
Farther afield, Russia could cancel other noxious weapons sales such as those to Hugo Chavez, who shares all the vices of hot-headedness that Russians like to point out in Mikheil Saakashvili, coupled with a lot more malice and authoritarianism, and all of it on a larger and more dangerous scale. And the weapons Russia is providing him are worse than the ones it gets angry about the United States providing to Georgia.
There are a number of such unilateral constructive steps or "reciprocations" that can be taken on both sides in this period, due to the accumulation of unilateral destructive steps in the last several years and thanks to some baggage inherited from the Cold War, such as Jackson-Vanik amendment.
Such reciprocations are all to the good. They resolve some problems. They set a good mood for creating a new relation. But they leave a sense of unfinished business and questions about “who owes the next move.” They do not actually create or consolidate a new relation.
For creation and consolidation, what is needed can only be along the lines of the reset plan announced by Rasmussen. The hard work of that plan would have to be carried through, in each of its stages: more joint effort in areas where we already agree on our interests and on a common approach; more diplomatic effort to reach common approaches on other areas, re-launching the NRC in this sense and joint work on threat assessment and a strategic doctrine.
Professor Stephen Blank, the U.S. Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA:
I am writing after seeing the first reports that Russia might entertain sanctions on Iran, a reply that confounds a lot of Western thinking, including my own, if it turns out to be true. But it is clear from reading the Russian press that there has been a mounting public division between various groups in Russia on Iran, notably between Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov on the one hand and Dmitry Medvedev on the other.
Specifically there has been growing apprehension about proliferation in general, primarily with regard to North Korea (which Medvedev recently said was even more dangerous than Iran) and now to Iran. Most likely this has something to do with the re-posturing of U.S. missile defenses, not the erroneous and even hysterical stories that the Poles and Czechs had been sold out. Nonetheless their sense of threat is real and must be allayed, and Moscow must come to terms with its own misconceived policies toward these states and learn that one does not bring peace and security by making threats which in any case cannot be carried out. It remains to be seen how much this divergence amongst Russian leaders opens up space for constructive ties with the West. Typically, Putin merely demands more concessions. And it is by no means certain that Moscow will vote to impose meaningful sanctions on Iran, after all, today it announced more sales of technology to Bushehr.
This move possibly strengthens Medvedev by giving him arguments in favor of his less confrontational though still strongly neo-imperial policies. At the same time, Moscow's denial of sovereignty and threats to the CIS and Eastern Europe and its efforts to undermine the status quo in Europe must be resisted and countered. In other words, we see nuances that could lead to something bigger, but it is premature to assert that we have achieved a breakthrough either in Russian domestic politics (as they impinge upon Russian foreign relations), or in East-West relations. Indeed, the gap inside Europe must be overcome, for we have seen no slackening of Moscow's attempts to subvert the governments in Eastern Europe and European public institutions, including NATO and the EU. There may be those in Paris, Berlin, or Rome who think that Mikhail Gorbachev's era has returned, but it is far too early for the champagne or the vodka. For Russia to indeed reform, European unity on a coherent policy toward it is a precondition.
Vladimir Belaeff, Global Society Institute, Inc. (USA):
The recent decision by Washington to modify the mode of deployment of a proposed U.S. ABM system in Europe is a very positive development. The general relief caused by this decision leads people to believe that the ABM program has been cancelled. This is not quite the case: the decision is to postpone deployment, and to consider alternative modalities, without depending on a Czech-Polish ground-based axis.
Nevertheless, the decision is definitely positive and leading away from what was in effect a revival of the Cold War. Russia’s response is adequately symmetric: plans to deploy Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region, near the Polish border – as a response to the intended Poland-based U.S. ABM platform – have been deferred also. One can expect that as long as ABM bases in Poland are not back in-plan, the Iskander missile deployment will not be considered either.
The visible disappointment, anxiety and anger of political leaders in the “New Europe” – in particular in Warsaw – uncover the real significance of these ABM elements to their intended host countries. Despite U.S. assurances to Russia that the missiles were “not aimed at Russia,” it is evident that in Poland the American ABM systems were perceived precisely as targeting Russian capabilities, and in Warsaw the “rogue nation” explanation was interpreted as a fig leaf. The reaction in Poland therefore confirms what Russia had claimed all along regarding the ABM proposal: that the system threatened Russian strategic capabilities. One hopes that this Polish perception, and its disclosure, is properly noted by Washington.
Meanwhile, “old” Europe, which is quietly angry at the ongoing antics of certain “new” Europe countries, generally sees the American ABM deployment plan as an irritant on many counts. The “rogue nation” defense excuse is very flimsy and really not convincing. “Old” Europe perceives the ABM plan as a pointless threat to Russia and a revival of the Cold War, in denial of the realities of the 21st century. So Washington scores two major policy successes with one simple decision, which improves the relationship with Russia and improves American standing in those parts of Europe that really count in world affairs.
The decision to postpone and modify the ABM deployment is a very significant step to remove a major obstacle on the path to normalization of U.S.-Russian relations. Because the deployment idea was originally an American initiative, Russia is unlikely to view the deferral as a concession, which it really is not. The decision, as was pointed out by senior American policymakers, was not “about Russia,” but about American needs and strategies. Because the decision was not about Russia, there is no basis to expect that Russia must “reciprocate” in the broader geopolitical theatre. For instance, if or when Russia were to change certain of its positions regarding Iranian weapons programs, such change will not be “about America” either.
The notion that president Obama’s announcement will influence the invented dichotomy of Medvedev-Putin is not substantive. There are no reasons to consider Medvedev a “progressive” as opposed to a presumably “reactionary” Putin. The classification “progressive-reactionary” is itself quaint and antiquated relative to the modern world, and there is no evidence to claim that either of the two gentlemen fits either of these obsolete labels.
Neither Medvedev nor Putin will be strengthened or weakened by president Obama’s European ABM decision – not in the least because that decision was not about Russia – it was about America. |
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